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I. BACKGROUND TO THE TORT AND INSURANCE PROBLEM
Spiraling insurance costs and the accompanying unavailability of
liability insurance have become an increasing nation-wide problem
in the 1980's.1 While the scope of the problem is severe, its contrib-
uting factors are not easily traced.2 Most authorities agree that there
1. B. Trolin, Controlling Liability Insurance Costs: State Actions and Future Initiatives
in the Area of CivilJustice Reform, 11 STATE LEGISLATIVE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CON-
FERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, No. 1 at 1 (Jan. 1986) (copy on file in the William
Mitchell Law Review Office).
2. Insuring Our Future, 1 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMISSION ON LIABILITY IN-
SURANCE TO THE GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK, pp. 2-3 (April 7, 1986) [hereinafter Insuring
Our Future] (copy on file in the William Mitchell Law Review Office). The Advisory
Commission Report offers an excellent analysis of the tort reform-insurance
problems. A second volume, released in July of 1986, explores additional solutions
to the insurance "crisis." See Insuring Our Future, 2 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMIS-
SION ON LIABILITY INSURANCE TO THE GOVENOR OF NEW YORK (July 1, 1986) [hereinaf-
ter Insuring Our Future, vol. 2] (copy on file in the William Mitchell Law Review
Office).
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are difficulties working together from two areas: the civil tort system
and the nature of the insurance industry itself.3 This Note compares
these areas in Minnesota by looking at the before and after statutory
scheme as determined by the recent Minnesota Tort Reform Act.
Specific attention is addressed to viewpoints emanating from the in-
surance business, trial practitioners, and customer-claimants.
Insurance is unique in that it combines two distinct businesses:
risk underwriting and investment.4 Investment income is earned
through investment of all available cash flow, including reserves,
stockholder equity, and premiums.5 Commercial property and casu-
alty insurers must maintain large portions of these investments in
very liquid forms in order to be ready for claims arising from natural
disasters, accidents, or product malfunction. 6 The resulting concen-
3. Id. For a more detailed discussion of the specific causes see infra notes 15-22
and accompanying text.
4. Insuring Our Future, supra note 2, at 49-50. The authors note that net earnings
through the combined activities of the two businesses is the primary goal of insur-
ance companies generally. This maximization for shareholders' benefit can some-
times act against the individual interest of the underwriting sector. Id. at 49.
Investment income should not be confused with underwriting income, however.
Underwriting income is the difference between premium revenues and the losses and
expenses incurred. It is from this total that investment income is generated. Esti-
mates from A.M. Best indicate that the industry as a whole grossed $142.3 billion
from its property/casualty lines. Of this total, $15.3 billion was estimated as the total
flow of the investment portion. Id. at 50-51 (citing Bests Insurance Management Re-
ports, Insurance Premium Distribution-1985, Release No. 22 (July 22, 1986)).
Critics argue that the figures released by insurers are inconclusive and the indus-
try covers up actual details of the flow between underwriting and investment.
Hunter, How to Tame the Insurance Industry Cycle and Make the Legal System More Efficient:
A Suggested Legislative Agenda for 1987, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSURANCE CONSUMER
ORGANIZATION (NICO) BEFORE THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF STATE LEGISLATURES (NCSL), at 4-5 (August 8, 1986) (copy on file in the William
Mitchell Law Review Office). See also infra note 59 and accompanying text.
5. Insuring Our Future, supra note 2, at 52. Investment activity tends to over-
shadow underwriting practices from a pure investment standpoint. Id.
6. See id. at 50-51. Beyond the difficulties of tracing income is the problem of
properly calculating premiums. Many property/casualty insurers wrote policies
known as "occurrence" policies. These policies insure against all covered occur-
rences that take place within the time period of the policy, regardless of when the
claim is made. As a result, claims made on a liability policy can continue 10 years or
more after the date of the policy. This phenomenon makes premium calculations,
with respect to claim totals, difficult to ascertain. The uncertainty contributes to poor
underwriting practices that may already be influenced by a scramble for capital. Id. at
53.
"Claims made" policies, which are more frequently used today, cover only
claims made within the policy. Limiting the time period in which claims can be made
cuts off the long insurance "tails" which thwart actuarial computations. Id. at 53-54.
With "occurrence" policies, uncertainty as to the existence of claims compares dis-
favorably to auto liability insurance, where claims can be used to calculate future
rates within one year or so of the policy period. Id. at 55. However, the use of
[Vol. 13
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tration in stocks, bonds, and other liquid financial instruments means
that investment income is very sensitive to changes in interest rates. 7
The underwriting sector of the industry, meanwhile, is responsive
to an entirely different set of economic and social indices including
medical costs, claim litigation and resulting legal costs, jury behav-
ior, and liability law.8 These needs are not adequately met when in-
terest rates and investment income are low and the subsidy to
underwriting operations is limited or removed altogether.9 Con-
versely, when interest rates and corresponding income are high, the
price of insurance policies does not properly reflect the full cost of
underwriting.' 0 In addition, during periods of high interest rates,
the competition for capital is fierce and insurers often accept ques-
tionable risks in order to increase operating capital.tt
The resulting fluctuations in the availability and affordability of lia-
bility policies is called the "insurance cycle."1 2 The current cycle,
"claims made" policies across the board for all liability insurance is likened to a
"blunderbuss when a rifleshot will do". Insuring Our Future, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 42.
7. Insuring Our Future, supra note 2, at 50.
8. Id. at 50-51.
9. Id. at 57-59. As a result, estimated reserves for compensating claims are sig-
nificantly understated. Id.
10. Id. at 49. The price of the premiums actually reflects the subsidizing by the
investment income of the operating costs of underwriting.
This appears to be a major reason for today's problems. In order to make up for
undercharged premiums, insurers are adding these costs to premium rates already
overburdened by unanticipated payments due to large jury awards. This "teeter-tot-
ter" effect strongly indicates that insurer-investment practices and public policy
needs are conflicting. Id. at 64.
11. Id. at 23-24. The commission report points to five major causative factors of
the deep financial hole dug by the industry:
(1) Industry reaction to interest rates: During 1983-84 the high interest rates spawned a
spectacular price war within the industry in a competition for capital. Even when
rates returned to normal, low prices were easily justified by the belief they would rise
again.
(2) Disincentives to stop the price war: Since competition was so fierce, no company
wished to be the first to raise prices to a sensible level. The resulting delay caused a
catastrophic jump in underwriting premium charges in 1984-85.
(3) Disbelief in the cost-surge of liability expenses: When evidence first became known to
insurers that liability expenses were rising, they did not change actuarial models used
to calculate premiums. The Commission theorized that cost increases were so great
that many insurers viewed them as an aberration.
(4) Desperate measures by imprudent underwriters to stay afloat: Companies who bet on
long-term persistence of very high interest rates, particularly small companies, re-
fused to raise prices. In a very short-sighted manner, they believed that the continu-
ing price war was the only way to generate cash to pay for premiums already rolling
in. The Commission notes that the insolvencies present in New York are replete with
this phenomenon.
(5) Regulatory impotence: Regulators did not wish to tell insurers that they should
raise prices for consumers already strapped by high interest rates. Id. at 68-69.
12. Id. at 70-72. As previously indicated, the very nature of property-casualty
1987]
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which appears to be in its trough, 13 is much more severe than those
of preceding years.' 4 This is generally attributed to unusually high
interest rates in the early 1980's, poor judgment in risk assessment
and premium rate calculations, high awards to claimants in civil liti-
gation,' 5 and a loss of capital from reinsurance sources.
16
From the insurance industry's perspective, civil litigation costs are
insurance business, by relying so heavily on interest rates, causes greater fluctuations
in availability and costs of insurance. Id. See also Sherman, Debate Begins in New Jersey
on Capping Liability Awards, 117 NJ.L.J. 471, 477 (Apr. 17, 1986).
13. Insuring Our Future, supra note 2, at 71. The "trough," described by the Com-
mission as Stage 1, was initially entered in 1976-77. At that time, the insured exper-
ienced scarcity, higher prices, and unavailability of certain lines. The insurer saw
rising revenues, higher combined ratios, and lower average risks. See Hunter, supra
note 4, at 4. Citing NICO statistics, the author indicates 1200% profits for the indus-
try in 1986, which probably do not reflect operating expenses. Id. The second stage,
most recently experienced in 1978-79, typifies a consolidation process. During this
time, new prices reached a plateau matching the actual costs of insurance protection.
At the same time, the insurance industry felt its peak, and gained the highest overall
profit.
Phase three showed an upturn for consumers with an easing of prices, greater
availability, and easier coverage bargaining. This was represented by the insurance
industry's glut of new capital spurred by high profits, lower overall earnings, and
price cutting. This phase was last turned over in 1979-80. Insuring Our Future, supra
note 2, at 71.
Phase four indicates rampant price cutting and full availability. At the same
time, insurers suffered massive underwriting losses, fierce competition for capital and
a major risk of insolvencies. This last phase continued into 1981 through 1984. Id.
14. Id. at 61. See also Hunter, supra note 4, at 3. The cycle has been turning over
since the 1930's, but nothing this severe has ever before occurred, mostly because of
volatile interest rates. Id. at 72.
A major indicator of financial performance is the return of shareholder equity
(ROE). Recent underwriting losses have overwhelmed premiums taken in, which has
forced insurers to erode their capital base to pay claims. The result, of course, is a
loss of shareholder equity. Id. at 61-64. Additional data released by the Insurance
Services Office, Inc. (ISO) indicates that reserves in the property-casualty lines are
under-reserved in an amount equal to 30-40% of the industry base. Further indica-
tions are that many groups are dipping deep into investment reserves to meet claims.
Id. at 58-59. Data from the reinsurance market indicates the deep-felt extent of the
problem. See infra note 16 (discussing lack of reinsurance).
15. See The Need for Legislative Reform of the Tort System, REPORT ON THE LIABILITY
CRISIS FROM AFFECTED ORGANIZATIONS, at 15-25 (May, 1986) (copy on file in the
William Mitchell Law Review Office)[hereinafter The Need for Reform]. The report
identifies three major flaws in the tort system. First, courts have expanded strict lia-
bility beyond the traditional fault basis of tort liability. Second, there has been a
significant increase in damage awards, largely through pain and suffering and puni-
tive damage awards. Third, money suits are brought that have no basis in the courts.
Id. at 15-42. See also Insuring Our Future, supra note 2, at 84-88; T. Marvell, There Is a
Litigation Explosion, 8 NAT'L L. J., no. 36, 19 (May 19, 1986) (tremendous caseload
increases in appellate courts accompanied by population growth). Contra Hunter,
supra note 4, at 2-4 (citing The Shockwaves Begin, NATIONAL UNDERWRITER 14 (May 30,
1986) (editorial in which Washington State Insurance Commissioner Dick Marquardt
is characterized as saying to insurance lobbyists "You people have said that civil jus-
[Vol. 13
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [1987], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol13/iss2/2
TORT REFORM
at the root of the problem.17 Increases in defense costs and jury
awards are only part of the difficulty.18 It is the unpredictability of an
ultimate award that vexes insurers. Since non-economic damage
totals cannot be ascertained, normal actuarial principles used to cal-
culate premium rates are hindered. 19 The unpredictabiliy of awards
only increases the assessed premium, particularly when the industry
is financially strapped, as in the current cycle. 20 General public
knowledge of the presence of insurance in most commercial activities
and increasing perceptions of what an injury is worth only exacer-
tice abuses have caused rates to soar. We believe you, and so we've acted to curb
these abuses. Now it's your turn to put up or shut up.").
The report also cites other states' experiences indicating that state imposed tort
reforms have little effect on industry rate hikes. Hunter, supra note 4, at 2-4.
16. Insuring Our Future, supra note 2, at 72-74. Reinsurance is the sale of liability
insurance contracts by the primary insurer to another insurance company, who as-
sumes the risks for a price. Id. This may occur with respect to a specific insured
("facultative reinsurance") or with regard to an entire line of underwriting ("treaty
insurance"). Often, the insured is unaware of the transaction, because reinsurance is
a private, contractual matter.
Reinsurance is important for several reasons. First, it frees up insurer liability
reserves for investment in a variety of ventures that do not require as much liquidity.
Second, it is a major source of offshore capital flow into the American insurance
market. Third, it is relatively inexpensive in comparison to direct lines, and is a good
vehicle to carry-off excess risk. Id. at 74-75. The ROE for reinsurers in the United
States was 20% per year until 1981, and by 1984 had turned negative. Id.
However, most of the reinsurance market is dominated by the British, notably
Lloyds of London and Weavers of London. In addition to the liability problem, these
reinsurers suffered a drastic drop in the value of the pound ($2.80 in 1965 to $1.05 in
early 1985), which made payments in dollars to United States companies much more
costly. Furthermore, Lloyds was rocked by an embezzlement scandal in 1985. Dur-
ing troughs of the insurance cycle, reinsurance is hard to find. Hunter, supra note 4,
at 13 (citing Business Insurance at 2 (July 21, 1986); Business Week at 57 (August 5,
1985), and Journal of Commerce (July 26-27, 1985)).
Current indications are that a severe lack of reinsurance will continue, slowing
the recovery of the industry. Insuring Our Future, supra note 2, at 77-78.
17. See The Need for Reform, supra note 15, at 2-4.
18. Report of Insurance Services Office, Inc., The Rising Costs of General Liabilitv
Legal Defense, at 3 (May, 1986). Estimates from the ISO indicate that for each dollar
insurers pay to injured claimants, $0.46 is dolled out to defense lawyers, double the
amount paid ten years ago. See also Report of ISO and National Association of In-
dependent Insurers, 1985: A Critical Year (May, 1985); The Need for Reform, supra note
15, at 15-24 (pointing out the problems caused by a system that apportions damage
beyond the parameters of actual fault).
19. Reinsurance Association of America, US. Reinsurance Market Reaction to the
U.S. Civil Justice System, at 8-10, 38 (March, 1985). This is due to the so-called
"landmark" tort decisions, which place insurers in a different economic environment
than the premiums were calculated for. Id. See also Insuring Our Future, supra note 2, at
78, 81-84.
20. Insuring Our Future, supra note 2, at 63-68. The increased pressure being felt
today from incoming claims might indeed forecast a more volatile cycle next time. Id.
19871
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bates the problem.2 1 Accordingly, the insurance lobby has worked
overtime to persuade state legislatures of the need for tort reform.22
II. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS FROM THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT,
OTHER STATES, AND MINNESOTA: ATrEMPTS TO TACKLE
THE PROBLEM
Responding to the national scope of the problem, Congress has
recently entertained federal bills pertaining to tort reform,23 risk re-
tention,24 insurance pooling,2 5 litigation abuse,26 and products lia-
bility.27 Insurance regulation, however, has traditionally been left to
21. See id. at 83-84. Society in general recognizes that insurance will spread the
costs of an award. As jury awards increase with the publicity that follows them, the
system comes under growing strain. The problem is particularly vivid when the de-
fendant is a large institution, either private or public. Id.
22. Hunter, supra note 4, at 24 (citing figures of a 6.5 million dollar lobbying
campaign by the insurance industry, reported in the JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, 1, 20
(March 19, 1986)).
23. See H.R. 4460, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. H1549 (1986); H.R.
4920, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. H3297 (1986). H.R. 4460 establishes
caps and damage ceilings as well as pleading and procedural alterations in certain
areas of tort practice.
H.R. 4920 is a proposal to establish arbitration panels in federal district courts
for use in medical malpractice, products liability, tort actions against governmental
bodies, and other personal injury suits. The bill also proposes a plan to establish
similar panels in state courts. Both bills are currently in the Senate Judiciary
Committee.
24. See H.R. 5225, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. H4825 (1986). In an
effort to salvage the anticipated dilution of IRA's after the enactment of the new tax
code, this proposal would amend the tax code to allow tax free transfers of IRA's to
long term insurance coverage in the form of risk retention groups.
The original Product Liability Risk Retention Act, 15 U.S.C. § 3901-04, (1982 &
Supp. II 1985), provides federal incentives and exemptions from state interference to
groups who wish to spread the risks of product liability among its members. Nor-
mally the members are involved in a same or similar business. Federal product liabil-
ity law pre-empts that of the states. 15 U.S.C. § 3902(a)(1982).
25. H.R. 1770, 99th Cong. 1st Sess., 132 CONG. REC. H933 (1986) is another
proposed amendment to the Internal Revenue Code. This measure would establish
statewide incentives to insurance pools for high risk individuals.
26. See S. 2046, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 132 CONG. REC. S1058 (1986) (authored by
Senator McConnell in an effort to control litigation abuse in the federal courts. The
bill was sent to the Senate Judiciary Committee on February 5, 1986.)
27. See S. 100, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S71 (1985), authored by
Senator Robert Kasten. See also Legis. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Consumer, of the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. (1985) (hear-
ings on S. 100 which offers amendments to the original bill, S. 44, 98th Cong. 2d
Sess., 130 CONG. REC. S6360 (1984)).
The combined bill is now before the Senate as S. 2760, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132
CONG. REC. S 11,745 (1986). This bill would establish a uniform products liability
law, addressing issues of damages, statutes of limitations and joint liability. This bill
is seen generally as a reflection of the national trend to lower the numbers of claims
[Vol. 13
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state action.28 As a result, forty-one states have enacted some type
of tort reform legislation in 1986.29
Minnesota, in step with the national trend, passed its own tort re-
form bill with the governor's signature on March 25, 1986.30 A
and amounts of speculative damages nationwide. See 132 CONG. REC. S12,751-754
(daily ed. Sept. 17, 1986) (comments by Sen. Kasten).
28. In 1944, the United States Supreme Court decided that the insurance indus-
try was subject to federal regulation. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Association, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). Congress, however, specifically returned regula-
tory authority back to the states that same year with the McCarren-Ferguson Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1944), which specifically exempts the insurance industry from
anti-trust suits. Id.
Some advocate repealing this Act due to: (1) the fact that the industry's contin-
ued growth has overwhelmed any single state's ability to regulate it; (2) evidence of
collusion by the industry to boycott certain lines and drive up prices; (3) the violent
swings in the market indicating a need for federal regulation. See Insuring Our Future,
supra note 2, at 35, 37. See also Hunter, supra note 4, at 20; J. Olender, The Great
Insurance Fraud of the '80's, 8 Nat'l L.J., July 21, 1986, at 15, col. 1.
The Cuomo Commission concludes, however, that the current arrangements be-
tween insurance companies and the state for sharing information have been in place
for decades, and form an intricate structure for assuring that reserves are in reason-
able balance with risks. Furthermore, the report implies that state regulatory meas-
ures may be strong enough, and that federal regualtion may only hurt smaller,
weaker insurance companies. The result may actually give the larger companies a
bigger hold on the market place. See Insuring Our Future, supra note 2, at 36-37.
Nowhere has the confrontation between state legislatures and the insurance in-
dustry been more animated than in West Virginia. In March, 1986, the West Virginia
legislature passed a bill, to take effect in June, that would have capped damage totals.
The bill also required disclosure of data and precluded policy cancellations without
"cause." The five major medical malpractice insurers in the state responded by in-
forming the state's doctors that their premiums would be cancelled on May 31 unless
the legislature repealed the anticancellation and disclosure provisions. The doctors
then went on strike for a day, prompting an injunctive action against the insurers by
the state attorney general. See Strasser, Tort Crisis Focus Shifts to Insurers; Relieffor Law-
yers?, 8 Nat'l L.J. June 9, 1986, at 1, col. 1 (citing West Virginia v. St. Paul Fire and
Marine, No. 86-1400 (Kanawha Cty. Cir. Ct. 1986)).
Finally, the West Virginia legislature reconvened in special session, and repealed
the controversial measures. See id. at 8, col. 1. The article cites a lobbyist for the St.
Paul Companies who stated that the non-renewal measure prevented insurance com-
panies from making business decisions. In addition, the requirement of reserve dis-
closure might impair an insurer's ability to negotiate with plaintiffs. Id. at 9, col. 1.
Insurance policies are contracts, and their renewal is optional for either party. See
supra note 16.
29. Trolin, supra note 1, at App. 1-12a. A survey by the NCSL indicated the fol-
lowing topics as the most popular among the state legislatures: municipal immunity,
limitations on pain and suffering, limitations on attorney's fees, dram shop regula-
tion, adoption of comparative negligence law in favor of joint and several liability,
reduction of statutes of limitations, limiting governmental exposure for damages due
to recreational activities, and limits on liability for medical care rendered by physi-
cian-trained mobile paramedics. Id. at 10. Minnesota's Tort Reform Act is substan-
tially similar to this pattern. See generally infra, notes 72-193 and accompanying text.
30. Tort Reform Act of March 25, 1986, ch. 455, 1986 Minn. Laws 840.
1987]
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product of compromise, the Minnesota act contains elements of bills
addressing both tort reform and increased insurance regulation.31
The differing approaches of the House and Senate reflect opposing
philosophies of how to address the insurance "crisis."
The House passed two bills that proposed specific changes in tort
liability, reflecting the insurance industry's position that premium
rate increases are caused by largejury verdicts and growing litigation
costs.3 2 House File 176433 sought immediate relief for the medical
industry, which has been particularly hard hit by increasing premium
costs. 34 Much of the bill focused on limiting damage awards at the
trial court level.35 House File 177636 made more sweeping tort re-
form proposals to current Minnesota law. Drastic overtures sought
to abolish the collateral source rule37 and reduce punitive dam-
ages.38 In addition, the bill attempted to cap non-economic dam-
ages3 9 and control abuses of the jury system. 40  Repeated
amendments in committee, however, watered down the impact of the
31. See infra notes 33-46 and accompanying text.
32. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
33. H.R. 1764, 74th Legis., 1st Sess. (March 3, 1986) (authored by Rep. Kathleen
Blatz).
34. See AMA Special Task Force on Professional Liability in the '80's, Report No. 1, at 7-
21 (medical malpractice premiums exceeded one billion dollars in 1975; in 1983, they
rose to $1.53 billion) [hereinafter Professional Liability]. See generally Church, Your Policy
is Cancelled, TIME 20 (March 24, 1986) (average medical malpractice award was
$338,463 in 1983-84, compared to an average of $94,947 in 1975).
35. H.R. 1764 applies many of the tort reform proposals eventually adopted and
passed in S.F. 2078, Tort Reform Act of March 25, 1986, ch. 455, 1986 Minn. Laws
840. Some of these include expert certification, collateral source offsets, discount of
future damages, provisions for paying periodic awards, and attorney's fees altera-
tions. Id.
36. H.F. 1776, 74th Legis., 2d Sess. (March 3, 1986) (authored by Rep. Kathy
Olsen).
37. See id. § 13. The collateral source rule is a common law doctrine which pre-
cludes certain offsets against plaintiff's tort recovery by amounts received from other
sources. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A (1977).
The rule operates mostly as an evidentiary device to prevent juries from being
influenced by knowledge of other benefits the plaintiff may receive. The rule has its
origins in British common law. See Comment, Unreason in the Law of Damages: The
Collateral Source Rule, 77 HARV. L. REV. 741, 742 (1964) (citing Bradburn v. Great W.
Ry. L.R., 10 Ex. 1 (1874)). The author points out that the rule results from two aims
of basic tort law, that the injured party must be made whole, and that the tortfeasor
must pay the loss. Id. See also infra notes 73-85 and accompanying text.
38. H.F. 1776 § 18, 74th Legis., 2d Sess. (March 3, 1986) (proposing new statute
applying comparative fault as the measure of damages).
39. See id. §§ 19, 34.
40. See id. § 33. An amendment to Minnesota Statutes section 549.22 would
schedule attorney's contingent fees according to the following schedule:
1) 33 percent of the first $200,000 recovered;
2) 25 percent of the next $200,000 recovered;
3) 10 percent of any amount exceeding $400,000.
[Vol. 13
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bill.41 By a resounding vote, the House subsequently returned both
bills to their original format.42
Meanwhile, Senate activities paralleled those of the House. Sena-
tor William Luther's bill contained some tort reform proposals in the
medical malpractice and municipal liability areas, but of a less sweep-
ing nature than the House measures.4
3
A compromise bill, Senate File 2078, was the center of heated de-
bate on the Senate floor.44 Numerous amendments, similar to those
contained in the House bills, were narrowly defeated. 45 The final
The limitations would apply to all civil actions, judgments, arbitrations and include
all plaintiffs. Id.
Another proposed addition to Minnesota Statutes section 548.44 would require
that contingency fees be allocated between lump sum awards representing future
damages and present awards to be paid periodically. See id. § 18.
These amendments are reflected in similar measures adopted as law under the
new Act. See infra notes 73-128 and accompanying text.
41. The Judiciary Committee, dominated by attorneys, gutted the bills. The
ceilings on contingency fees, guidelines for periodic payments and future damages,
the banishment of punitive damages and the limitations on non-economic damages
were lifted.
42. The bills were re-referred to the Judiciary Committee on Feb. 24, 1986. See
Floor Debate on H.F. 1764 and H.F. 1776 in the Minnesota House of Representatives, 74th
Minn. Legis., 1st Sess., March 24, 1968 (audio tape).
43. S.F. 1950, 74th Legis., 1st Sess. (1986), incorporated three previous bills
sponsored by Senator Luther. S.F. 1593, 74th Minn. Legis., 1st Sess. (1986) pro-
posed increased disclosure requirements of insurance companies and offered to ex-
tend the JUA. S.F. 2031, 74th Minn. Legis., 1st Sess. (1986) proposed to remove
punitive damages from pleadings. Eventually, this proposal was enacted into law in
the Tort Reform Act, under S.F. 2078. An opposition bill, S.F. 1687, proposed by
Senator Kamrath, reflected sentiments raised in the House. See supra notes 36-40 and
accompanying text. Senator Kamrath's bill would also have abolished the collateral
source rule, punitive damages, and joint and several liability, as well as cap intangible
damages. At the trial level, the bill proposed to place a sliding scale on contingent
legal fees. See S.F. 1687, 74th Minn. Legis., 1st Sess. (1986). A lesser bill, S.F. 1727,
74th Minn. Legis., 1st Sess. (1986) proposed limits on liability claims against the
Hennepin County Park District.
44. See Floor Debate on S.F. 2078 in the Minnesota Senate, 74th Minn. Legis., 1st
Sess., March 11, 1986 (audio tape). The debate over the bill lasted five hours. Id.
45. The first major amendment, A-40, proposed by Senator Sieloff, would have
reduced the statute of repose on construction contract actions to seven years. Sena-
tor Sieloff commented that 97.9 percent of all lawsuits against the construction in-
dustry were brought within seven years, and yet, the industry had to maintain liability
insurance for 20 years after completion of a project.
However, Senator Luther suggested that major claims for defective construction
are brought after seven years, and the useful life of a building should extend well
beyond that time. See Floor Debate on S.F. 1950 in the Minnesota Senate, A-40, (de-
feated), 74th Minn. Legis., 1st Sess. (audio tape). See infra notes 129-33 and accom-
panying discussion.
A-14, sponsored by Senator Chmielewski, contemplated a $400,000 cap for pain
and suffering, noting that a $30,000 cap on intangible damages existed for dram
shop actions. He also pointed out that California limited intangible losses to
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product, essentially the same as the original Senate bill, now stands
as the Minnesota Tort Reform Act.46 Though the Act encompasses a
total of ninety-four separate statutory amendments, it operates in
three major theatres: "hands-on" public involvement in the insur-
ance industry,47 general tort reform applicable to all liability scena-
rios,48 and specific tort reform for particular areas of exposure.4 9
III. "HANDS-ON" STATE ADMINISTRATION OF INSURANCE PRACTICES
A. Joint Underwriting Association
The MinnesotaJoint Underwriting Association (JUA) is a state-run
insurance plan designed to provide liability insurance for those per-
sons or entities unable to procure insurance from private sources. 50
$250,000. Senator Kamrath concurred, adding that all intangible losses should be
capped, because insurers could not properly calculate their exposure. See Floor Debate
on S.F. 1950 in the Minnesota Senate, 74th Minn. Legis., 1st Sess., March 11, 1986 (au-
dio tape).
Senator Luther opposed the motion, commenting that he could not personally
obtain a promise that premium rates would go down if awards were capped. The
strength of tort reform is weeding out frivolous claims without limiting damages to
those most seriously injured. The amendment, A-14, failed by a 32-32 vote. Id.
(comment by Senators Kamrath, Chmielewski and Luther).
An interesting side-show occurred when a voice vote abolishing joint and several
liability mistakenly carried. After some anxious moments, Senator Peterson moved
for a vote on the amendment, which subsequently failed. Id. The vote followed an
intense discussion on the merits ofjoint and several liability versus strict comparative
fault. Proponents of comparative fault appealed to the simplicity of a system in which
each party is responsible for its own fault. Id. (comments by Senator Peterson, Sena-
tor Sielofi).
Concern was also raised about theJUA. Senator Wegscheid opposed its imple-
mentation since it was not tailored to specific problems, and would become too
costly. Id. (comment by Senator Wegscheid without amendment). Senator Luther
suggested that insurance companies could control that factor by continuing to pro-
vide insurance in "speciality" lines and avoid the problem of unavailability in the first
place. Id. (comment by Senator Luther).
An additional amendment, A-18 sponsored by Senator Dahl, disallowed discrim-
inatory practices in auto insurance policies that increased premium rates for divorced
spouses. The practice based the rates on data obtained prior to the marriage. Id.
(comments by Senator Dahl, Senator Luther).
46. Tort Reform Act of March 25, 1986, ch. 455, 1986 Minn. Laws 840.
47. Id. §§ 3-41, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 842-63. See infra notes 50-71 and accom-
panying text.
48. Id. §§ 80-88, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 878-84. See infra notes 72-128 and ac-
companying text.
49. Id. §§ 60-79, 92-93. See infra notes 129-86 and accompanying text.
50. Tort Reform Act of 1986, ch. 455, §§ 20-41, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 850-63
(codified at MINN. STAT. § 621.0 1-.22 (1986)). TheJUA's purpose is to provide liabil-
ity insurance for "specialty" line entities, i.e., those groups who are too few in
number to substantiate an insurer's continued presence in their business. See id.
§ 21, subd. 1, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 851. Minnesota Statutes section 621.02, subdivi-
sion 1 provides as follows:
[Vol. 13
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The new bill extends the former temporary form of the JUA.5l The
JUA is specifically authorized to cover non-profit organizations and
charities, such as group homes and foster care facilities.,2 However,
any entity or business that is refused coverage elsewhere may
apply.5
3
CREATION. The Minnesota joint underwriting association is created to
provide insurance coverage to any person or entity unable to obtain insur-
ance through ordinary methods if the insurance is required by statute, ordi-
nance or otherwise required by law, or is necessary to earn a livelihood or
conduct a businesss and serves a public purpose. Prudent business practice
or mere desire to have insurance coverage is not a sufficient standard for the
association to offer insurance coverage to a person or entity. The associa-
tion shall be specifically authorized to provide insurance coverage to day
care providers, foster parents, foster homes, developmental achievement
centers, group homes, and sheltered workshops for mentally, emotionally,
or physically handicapped persons, and citizen participation groups estab-
lished pursuant to the housing and community redevelopment act of 1974,
Public Law Number 93-383. Because the activites of certain persons or enti-
ties present a risk that is so great, the association shall not offer insurance
coverage to any person or entity the board of directors of the association
determines is outside the intended scope and purpose of the association
because of the gravity of the risk of offering insurance coverage. The associ-
ation shall not offer environmental impairment liability or product liability
insurance, or coverage for activities that are conducted substantially outside
the state of Minnesota unless the insurance is required by statute, ordi-
nance, or otherwise required by law. Every insurer authorized to write
property and casualty insurance in this state shall be a member of the associ-
ation as a condition to obtaining and retaining a license to write insurance in
this state.
Id.
51. Tort Reform Act of 1986, ch. 455, §§ 15-19, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 850
(amending MINN. STAT. § 62F.01-.04 & 62G.16, subd. 9).
52. See id. § 21, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 851.
53. Id. § 32, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 859 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 621.13 (1986)).
Subdivisions 2 and 3 outline the general eligibility requirements:
Subd. 2. MINIMUM OF QUALIFICATIONS. Anyone who is unable to ob-
tain insurance in the private market and who so certifies to the association in
the application is eligible to make written application to the association for
coverage. Payment of the applicable premium or required portion of it must
be paid prior to coverage by the association. An offer of coverage at a rate
in excess of the rate that would be charged by the association for similar
coverage and risk shall be deemed to be a refusal of coverage for purposes
of eligibility for participation in the association. It shall not be deemed to be
a written notice of refusal if the rate for coverage offered is less than five
percent in excess of the joint underwriting association rates for similar cov-
erage and risk. However, the offered rate must also be the rate that the
insurer has filed with the department of commerce if the insurer is required
to file its rates with the department. If the insurer is not required to file its
rates with the department, the offered rate must be the rate generally
charged by the insurer for similar coverage and risk.
Subd. 3. DISQUALIFYING FACTORS. For good cause, coverage may be
denied or terminated by the association. Good cause may exist if the appli-
cant or insured: (1) has an outstanding debt due or owing to the association
at the time of application or renewal arising from a prior policy; (2) refises
to permit completion of an audit requested by the commissioner or adminis-
trator; (3) submits misleading or erroneous information to the commis-
sioner or administrator; (4) disregards safety standards, laws, rules or
19871
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The JUA is funded by two procedures. Each member insurer is
responsible for losses and expenses in proportion to the written pre-
miums that member purchases to the premiums written for all mem-
bers. 54 In addition, a "Stabilization Reserve Fund" is created by a
surcharge on each premium paid to the association.55 The Reserve
Fund was proposed to protect theJUA from insolvency due to large
or unanticipated claims.56 However, if a deficit does occur, member
insurers may be assessed additional amounts, again relative to their
share of the market.57
While the application procedure is easily complied with, the cover-
age it provides is limited. The JUA is specifically precluded from
providing product liability insurance, environmental coverage or in-
suring any other activities whose risk the Association Board deter-
mines is "outside the intended scope and purpose of the
association."58 Joint Underwriting Associations are increasing in
ordinance pertaining to the risk being insured; (5) fails to supply informa-
tion requested by the commissioner or administrator; (6) fails to comply
with the terms of the policies or contracts for coverage issued by the associa-
tion; and (7) has not satisfied the requirements of the market assistance pro-
gram as set forth in section 28.
Id. The Market Assistance Plan establishes a committee to review applications and
establish guidelines to link member insurers with applicants. See id. § 28-29, 1986
Minn. Laws 840, 856-58 (codified at MINN. STAT. §§ 621.09 -10 (1986)).
54. See id. § 26, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 855 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 621.07
(1986)), which provides as follows:
Each member of the association shall participate in its losses and expenses
in the proportion that the direct written premiums of the member bears to
the total aggregate direct written premiums written in this state by all mem-
bers. The members' participation in the association shall be determined an-
nually on the direct written premiums written during the preceeding
calendar year as reported on the annual statements and other reports filed
by the member with the commissioner.
Id. Every insurer who writes insurance, in Minnesota, including surplus insurance,
must participate. See id. § 29, subd. 2, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 857 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 621.10, subd. 2. (1986)).
55. The creation of the Reserve Fund is described at id. § 35, 1986 Minn. Laws.
840, 860-61 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 621.16, subd. 1 (1986)):
CREATION. There is created a stabilization reserve fund. Each policy-
holder shall pay to the association a stabilization reserve fund charge of 33
percent of each premium payment due for insurance through the associa-
tion. This charge shall be separately stated in the policy. The association
shall cancel the policy of any policy holder who fails to pay the stabilization
reserve fund charge.
Id. The funds are held in trust, whose proceeds are invested by the corporate trustee.
All proceeds left over at the policy year's end are returned to the policyholders after
expenses are met. Id. § 35, subd. 3, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 860-61.
56. See id.
57. See id. § 25, subd. 6, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 854 (codified at MINN. STAT.
§ 621.06, subd. 6.)
58. See id. § 21, subd. 1, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 851 (codified at MINN. STAT.
§ 621.02, subd. 1).
[Vol. 13
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [1987], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol13/iss2/2
TORT REFORM
popularity as an alternative to tort reform.59
B. Increased Public Involvement in Other Areas
The JUA and its companions, the Risk Management Fund,60 the
Non-Profit Risk Indemnification Trust Act,61 and the Fair Plan Act62
substantially increase the active powers already conferred on the
Commissioner of Commerce to regulate the insurance industry.63
The growing participation of government in insurance regulation re-
59. Hunter, supra note 4, at 11-12. JUAs were initially established during the last
trough of the liability cycle in 1975-76 for medical malpractice insurance. Id.
60. See Tort Reform Act, ch. 455, § 3, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 842 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 16B.85). The Risk Management Fund is a state-created fund operating
as an alternative to conventional insurance. Id. § 3, subd. 1, 1986 Minn. Laws 840,
842. The fund's operation, under the direction of the commissioner, is outlined in
subdivision 2, as follows:
RISK MANAGEMENT FUND. A state risk management fund is created. All
state agencies which have had or may have casualty claims against them with
respect to the risks for which the commissioner has implemented conven-
tional insurance alternatives shall contribute to the fund a portion of the
money appropriated to them. The commissioner shall determine the pro-
portionate share of each agency on the basis of the agency's casualty claim
experience as compared to other affected agencies. The money in the fund
to pay casualty claims arising from state activities and for administrative
costs, including costs for the adjustment and defense of the claims, is appro-
priated to the commissioner. Interest earned from the investment of money
in the fund shall be credited to the fund and be available to the commis-
sioner for the expenditures authorized in this subdivision. The fund is ex-
empt from the provisions of section 16A.15, subdivision 1. In the event that
proceeds in the fund are insufficient to pay outstanding claims and associ-
ated adminstrative costs, the commissioner, in consultation with the com-
missioner of finance, may assess state agencies participating in the fund
amounts sufficient to pay the costs. The commissioner shall determine the
proportionate share of the assessment of each agency on the basis of the
agency's casualty claim experience as compared to other affected agencies.
Id. § 3, subd. 2, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 842.
61. Id. § 8, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 845-47 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 60A.29).
The Act allows non-profit organizations to establish trusts to indemnify themselves
and their employees from tort liability. Id. § 8, subds. 2 & 3, 1986 Minn. Laws 840,
845.
62. Minnesota Statutes sections 65A.31-.43 (1986) was created to help place resi-
dential and property owners with private insurers. The plan prevented denials of
property insurance without a physical inspection of the property. MINN. STAT.
§ 65A.35, subd. 2.
As amended, the Fair Plan also encompasses liablity and casualty insurance.
Tort Reform Act, ch. 455, §§ 42-47, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 863-66. The Plan's oper-
ation can be altered at the commissioner's direction. MINN. STAT. § 65A.35, subd. 4
(1986).
63. See, e.g., Minnesota Insurance Guaranty Association Act, MINN. STAT.
§ 60C.01-.20 (1986). The statute requires state management of those insurance
companies who become insolvent. Id. § 60C.02, subds. 1 & 2. The Act makes the
state an insurer of the insolvent company's claims. See MINN. STAT. § 65C.05, subd.
I(a); see also MINN. STAT. § 61B.01-.16 (1986).
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flects concerns of liability insurance availability.64 Required by law
in almost every field of private industry, liability insurance underwrit-
ing has become almost quasi-public in its operations.65
In order to facilitate the Commissioner's increased duties, insurers
licensed in Minnesota must supply annual informational reports on
their writings in certain lines of insurance coverage. 66 The require-
ments are very specific, and include details on such matters as premi-
ums written, investment income, incurred claims, and reserves for
64. See generally R. Brunelli, Time for Action to Ease Liability Rates, Conf. of Mid-
America Institute for Public Policy Research (March 18-19, 1986) (cited in 132 Chi-
cago Daily L.B., at 1, col. 2 (March 20, 1986)).
65. Insuring Our Future, supra note 2, at 21; The Need for Reform, supra note 15, at 1-
6, 44-45. The report notes that the risk-spreading tendencies of today's large dam-
age awards make all products, services, and professions more expensive; the costs are
simply passed on to consumers. Id.
66. Tort Reform Act, ch. 455, § 6, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 843-44 (amending
MINN. STAT. § 60A.13 (1984) by adding subd. 8)). All insurers must make annual
reports, pursuant to the following guidelines:
ANNUAL REPORTS. Each insurer licensed to write property and casualty
insurance in this state, as a supplement to the annual statement required by
this section, shall submit a report on a form furnished by the commissioner
separately showing its direct writings in Minnesota and in the United States
on: liquor liability, product liability, medical malpractice, and any other line
so designated by the commissioner on January 1 of each year.
The supplemental reports must include the following data for the previous
year ending on the 31st day of December:
(1) direct premiums written;
(2) direct premiums earned;
(3) net investment income, including net realized capital gains and losses,
using appropriate estimates where necessary;
(4) incurred claims, developed as the sum, and with figures provided for,
of the following:
(a) dollar amount of claims closed with payment, plus
(b) reserves for reported claims at the end of the current year, minus
(c) reserves for reported claims at the end of the previous year, plus
(d) reserves for incurred but not reported claims at the end of the
current year, minus
(e) reserves for incurred but not reported claims at the end of the
previous year, plus
(f) reserves for loss adjustment expense at the end of the current
year, minus
(g) reserves for loss adjustment expense at the end of the previous
year;
(5) actual incurred expenses allocated separately to loss adjustment, com-
missions, other acquisition costs, general office expenses, taxes,
licenses and fees, and all other expenses;
(6) net underwriting gain or loss; and
(7) net operation gain or loss, including net investment income.
This report is due by the first of May of each year and the report due May 1,
1987 must cover the last six months of 1986. The commissioner shall annu-
ally compile and review all reports submitted by insurers pursuant to this
section. These filings must be published and made available to any inter-
ested insured or citizen.
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claims and expenses. 67 Additional rules regulating insurer practices
require that the insured be informed of premium rate increases at
least thirty days before the policy expiration date.68
The increased information requirements and the permanent en-
trenchment of the JUA are considered victories by those interest
groups who feel the current crisis has been caused by insurance in-
dustry practices. 69 On the other hand, insurers have raised concerns
that increased premium rate expenses will result from the additional
administrative costs. They also argue that heavy-handed tactics will
cause underwriters to reconsider offering liability insurance to cer-
tain Minnesota residents and businesses.70 The insurance industry
has consistently maintained that premium rates would deflate if leg-
islatures would focus on controlling huge jury awards, which drain
reserves. 71 These opposing public policy arguments are at the very
heart of the insurance and tort liability crisis, a tension visible
throughout this discussion. Undoubtedly, both factions will be
closely monitoring the effects of the Tort Reform Act in contempla-
tion of future changes.
IV. GENERAL TORT REFORM PROVISIONS
A. Collateral Source Rule Changes
In order to prevent double recovery of damages by plaintiffs in
liability lawsuits, the legislature has limited the scope of the "collat-
67. Id.
68. Id. § 58, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 870 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 60A.30
(1986)). The new subdivision provides as follows:
If an insurance company licensed to do business in this state offers or pur-
ports to offer to renew any commercial liability and/or property insurance
policy at less favorable terms as to the dollar amount of coverage or deduct-
ibles, higher rates and/or higher rating plan, the new terms, the new rates
and/or rating plan may take effect on the renewal date of the policy if the
insurer has sent to the policyholder notice of the new terms, new rates
and/or rating plan at least 30 days prior to the expiration date. If the in-
surer has not so notified the policyholder, the policyholder may elect to can-
cel the renewal policy within the 30-day period after receipt of the notice.
Earned premiums for the period of coverage, if any, shall be calculated pro
rata upon the prior rate. This subdivision does not apply to ocean marine
insurance, accident and health insurance, and reinsurance.
Id.
69. See Cole, Tort Reform: Scratching the Surface as a Start, MINN. DEFENSE 8-9 (Sept.
1986). The author specifically points to the commissioner's office as the victor in the
last legislative session. Id. at 9. See supra notes 4-16 and accompanying text.
70. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, REPORT OF THE ADVI-
SORY COMMISSION ON LIABILITY INSURANCE (vol. II 1986) (cited in 72 A.B.A.J. 26
(Sept. 1, 1986)) (implying that states who do not have JUAs, at least initially, may
provide better markets for the industry). Id.
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eral source rule."72 A creature of substantive and evidentiary back-
ground, the common law rule precludes an offset of benefits
conferred upon the plaintiff by third party sources as a result of the
plaintiff's injuries.73 The new Act relaxes the rule and increases the
number of situations where payments received by the plaintiff from
other sources must be deducted from the total award.74 These now
include government-sponsored disability and workers' compensation
benefits, health, accident or automobile insurance, and wage contin-
uation or compensation plans provided by employers.75 The Act
specifically excludes life insurance benefits, social security benefits,
pension plans, or private disability insurance policies for which the
plaintiff paid a valuable consideration.76
The new statute requires a party to file a motion requesting collat-
eral source determinations within ten days of the verdict's entry.7 7
Upon filing the motion, both parties must submit evidence of collat-
72. See supra note 37 for definitions.
73. See id. One reason for the rule is well stated in Grayson v. Williams, 256 F.2d
61, 65 (10th Cir. 1958):
No reason in law, equity or good conscience can be advanced why a wrong-
doer should benefit from part payment from a collateral source of damages
caused by his wrongful act. If there must be a windfall certainly it is more
just that the injured person shall profit therefrom, rather than the wrong-
doer shall be relieved of his full responsibility for his wrongdoing.
Id.
74. Tort Reform Act, ch. 455, § 80, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 878-79 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 548.36 (1986)). Subdivision one defines collateral sources as follows:
For purposes of this section, "collateral sources" means payments related to
the injury or disability in question made to the plaintiff, or on the plaintiff's
behalf up to the date of the verdict, by or pursuant to:
(1) a federal, state, or local income disability or workers' compensation
act; or other public program providing medical expenses, disability
payments, or similar benefits;
(2) health, accident and sickness, or automobile accident insurance or lia-
bility insurance that provides health benefits or income disability cov-
erage; except life insurance benefits available to the plaintiff, whether
purchased by the plaintiff or provided by others, payments made pur-
suant to the United Sates Social Security Act, or pension payments;
(3) a contract or agreement of a group, organization, partnership, or cor-
poration to provide, pay for, or reimburse the costs of hospital, medi-
cal, dental or other health care services; or
(4) a contractual or voluntary wage continuation plan provided by employ-
ers or any other system intended to provide wages during a period of
disability, except benefits received from a private disability insurance
policy where the premiums were wholly paid for by the plaintiff.
Id. § 80, subd. 1, 1986 Minn. Laws at 878.
75. See id.
76. Id.
77. Id. § 80, subd. 2, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 878. Subdivision two provides:
In a civil action, whether based on contract or tort, when liability is admitted
or is determined by the trier of fact, and when damages include an award to
compensate the plaintiff for losses available to the date of the verdict by
collateral sources, a party may file a motion within ten days of the date of
entry of the verdict requesting determination of collateral sources. If the
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eral sources, both collected upon and available to the plaintiff.7 8 Af-
terwards, the court determines the amount of collateral sources to be
offset from the total damage award.79 Significantly, attorneys' fees
based on the award are limited to the amount remaining after the
offset.80
Some potential shortcomings of the rule may exist, however. The
statute does not clarify the term "collateral sources . . . otherwise
available to the plaintiff."81 Conceivably, sources whose potential li-
ability to the plaintiff have not been determined at the time of a ver-
dict will be included or excluded to the disadvantage of one of the
litigants. Resulting inequities may encourage plaintiffs to ignore, or
even worse, conceal an "available" collateral source.8 2 What were
formerly fact issues surrounding the various amounts due from col-
lateral sources might now be determined by a court as a matter of
motion is filed, the parties shall submit written evidence of, and the court
shall determine:
(1) amounts of collateral sources that have been paid for the benefit of the
plaintiff or are otherwise available to the plaintiff as a result of losses
except those for which a subrogation right has been asserted; and
(2) amounts that have been paid, contributed, or forfeited by, or on behalf
of, the plaintiff or members of the plaintiff's immediate family for the
two-year period immediately before the accrual of the action to secure




79. Id. § 80, subd. 3, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 878-79. Subdivision 3 defines the
duties of the court:
(a) The court shall reduce the award by the amounts determined under
subdivision 2, clause (1), and offset any reduction in the award by the
amounts determined under subdivision 2, clause (2).
(b) If the court cannot determine the amounts specified in paragraph (a)
from the written evidence submitted, the court may within ten days
request additional written evidence or schedule a conference with the
parties to obtain further evidence.
Id.
80. Id. § 80, subd. 4, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 879. Subdivision 4 provides:
If the fees for legal services provided to the plaintiff are based on a percent-
age of the amount of money awarded to the plaintiff, the percentage must be
based on the amount of the award as adjusted under subdivision 3. Any
subrogated provider of a collateral source not separately represented by
counsel shall pay the same percentage of attorneys' fees as paid by the plain-
tiff and shall pay its proportionate share of the costs.
Id.
81. See id. § 80, subd. 2, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 878.
82. The availability of collateral sources may be in doubt at the time of the ver-
dict. A court may improperly assess the existence of a collateral source or miscalcu-
late it. Affidavits may be difficult to obtain from a source not yet willing to concede
liability.
Since the scope of the amendment is limited to payments for economic damages,
the calculations should be easier to ascertain. Id.
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law.8 3 Under the new Act, if the court cannot immediately ascertain
the collateral sources to be deducted, it may request additional evi-
dence or schedule a conference, but must do so within ten days.84
Abolition or alteration of the collateral source rule has been popular
with many legislatures, particularly in the medical malpractice area.
8 5
B. Punitive Damages and Frivolous Claims
Punitive damages, under past practice, were alleged in numerous
lawsuits, whether appropriate or not.86 In order to limit them to the
appropriate situations, the new Act only allows punitive damages to
be asserted in a motion to amend the initial complaint. 8 7 The mo-
tion must allege a "legal basis" for punitive damages, accompanied
with an affidavit "showing the factual basis of the claim."88 Before
allowing the amended pleading, the court must find "prima facie"
evidence that supports the motion.89 The court must still adhere to
the "willful indifference" standard of the former statute. 90
83. Id. See TASK FORCE ON LITIGATION ISSUES, REPORT TO THE BOARD OF REGENTS
4 (1986).
84. Tort Reform Act, ch. 455, § 80, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 878 (to be codified at
MINN. STAT. § 548.36, subd. 3(b)).
85. ALASKA STAT. § 09.35.548 (1986) (medical malpractice only); ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12-565 (1986 Supp.) (medical malpractice only); CONN. ACTS 85-574
(1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.51 (West 1986) (medical malpractice only); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 42.020 (1985) (medical malpractice only); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 59:9-2
(1986) (claims against public entities); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. § 4545 (Supp. 1986); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.05; § 2305.27 (Anderson 1981 & Supp. 1985) (medical mal-
practice); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8553(d)(Purdon 1982 Supp.) (insurance benefits
from other sources offset); R.I. GEN. LAWs § 9-19-34, 9-19-34.1 (1985 Supp. & 1986)
(medical malpractice).
86. The practice was particularly prevalent in professional malpractice actions.
Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Committee on S.F. 1670, 74th Minn. Legis., 2d Sess.,
February 19, 26, 1986 (audio tape).
87. Tort Reform Act of 1986, ch. 455, § 82, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 880 (codified
at MINN. STAT. § 549.191 (1986)). The new statute provides:
Upon commencement of a civil action, the complaint must not seek punitive
damages. After filing the suit a party may make a motion to amend the
pleadings to claim punitive damages. The motion must allege the applica-
ble legal basis under section 549.20 or other law for awarding punitive dam-
ages in the action and must be accompanied by one or more affidavits
showing the factual basis for the claim. At the hearing on the motion, if the
court finds prima facie evidence in support of the motion, the court shall
grant the moving party permission to amend the pleadings to claim punitive
damages. For purposes of tolling the statute of limitations, pleadings





90. See id. (incorporating MINN. STAT. § 549.20 (1986). See also McGuire v. C & L
Restaurant, Inc., 346 N.W.2d 605, 615 (Minn. 1984) (reiterating statute's require-
ment that punitive damages be based upon conduct that is willfully indifferent to the
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The legislature places a great deal of hope in the new punitive
damages statute.9' The concept of punitive damages in civil actions
has long been a source of controversy. 92 Defense lobbyists maintain
that punitive damages have no place in the current system, particu-
larly at a jury's disposal.93 The uncertainty of whether such damages
will be awarded frustrates insurers attempting to settle claims. While
they cannot insure against punitive acts, they must often pay for the
defense of claims that allege such damages, and include other
torts .94
Plaintiffs' advocates quickly point out that punitive damages have a
long history as a deterrant to the type of activities that cause the in-
jury.95 Removal of punitive damages would certainly aid predictabil-
ity of litigation results, but might also create a predictability that
would allow unscrupulous industries to incorporate the economic
rights of others). There must be clear and convincing evidence that the conduct of
the defendant warrants the award. See also Alsop & Herr, Punitive Damages in Minnesota
Products Liability Cases: A Judicial Perspective, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 319, 323, 346
(1985).
91. Floor Debate on H.F. 1950 in the Minnesota House of Representatives, 74th Minn.
Legis., 2d Sess., March 12, 1986 (audio tape) (statements of Senator Luther that new
measure would reduce punitive claims by 90%).
92. Punitive damages evolved from criminal concepts of punishment and deter-
rence. However, a jury's attention is often directed towards the severe nature of the
plaintiff's injuries. See Haugen & Tarkow, Punitive Damages in Minnesota: The Common
Law and Developments Under Section 549.20 of the Minnesota Statutes, 11 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 353, 363-65 (1985) (discussing Eisert v. Greenberg Roofing and Sheet Metal
Co., 314 N.W.2d 226 (Minn. 1982)).
93. This point was raised before the Senate Committees. The problem in medi-
cal malpractice actions is that the conduct is not really that of "willful indifference,"
and the nature of the complaint does not reflect the standard. Rhetorically speaking,
why should the award also reflect that standard? See Testimony on S.F. 1670 Before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, 74th Minn. Legis., 1st Sess., Feb. 19, 26, 1986 (audio tape).
It was suggested that punitive damages should be remedial in nature and linked to
the economic nature of the damages, simliar to anti-trust treble damages. Id. (com-
ments by Philip Cole, President of Minnesota Defense Lawyers Assoc.). See also Ham-
mitt, Caroll and Nelles, Tort Standards and Jury Decisions, 14 J. LEGAL STAND. 751
(1985).
94. See, e.g., Prahm v. Rupp Constr. Co., 277 N.W.2d 389, 390 (Minn. 1979). An
insurer is required to defend a suit brought against its insured even if it is unsure of
the coverage offered under the policy. Id. at 391. While an insurer cannot insure
against punitive damages, the possibility that another claim of questionable coverage
could result in punitive damages, undoubtedly increases defense costs. See Casp-
ersen v. Webber, 298 Minn. 93, 100, 213 N.W.2d 327, 331 (1973) (dicta implying
that punitive damages are not payable by insurer).
95. See Haugen and Tarkow, supra note 92, at 356-63. The purpose of punitive
damages is to prohibit unlawful purposes or lawful purposes achieved by unlawful
means, expressing society's indignation at such activity. Id. (citing Anderson v. Int'l
Harvester Co. of America, 104 Minn. 49, 53, 116 N.W. 101, 103 (1908). See also
Testimony on S.F. 1687 Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 74th Minn. Legis., 2d Sess.,
Feb. 26, 1986 (audio tape).
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losses resulting from injury into the marketing of a product.96 Such
practices, these allies argue, go beyond the "willfull indifference"
standard to one of "intentional disregard."97
Punitive damages have been a popular target of tort reform na-
tionwide.98 Currently, efforts are concentrated on capping "intangi-
ble" damage totals, rather than abolishing the remedy altogether.99
Another legislative effort toward a more exacting litigation process
was directed at frivolous claims.100 Upon its own motion, a court
may award costs, disbursements, attorneys' fees or witness fees for
96. See Hunter, supra note 4, at 39. Hunter argues that the punitive tort system is
the only valid way to force corporate defendants into disclosure of possible danger-
ous activities. Id.
97. Haugen & Tarkow, supra note 92, at 379-80. The standard of care has been
described in many ways. The authors note that malice is the standard often applied,
and the Minnesota Supreme Court has defined malice in a variety of different ways.
Id. See Meetings on H.F. 1776 Before the House Financial Institution and Insurance Committee,
74th Minn. Legis., 1986 Sess., Feb. 19, 1986 (audio tape). The concern over the
ability of certain industries to economically incorporate human losses remains as a
strong argument, although an "intentional" standard is viewed as a compromise. Id.
(comments by Rep. Skoglund).
98. See Trolin, supra note 1, at 10-11. The major efforts, however, are directed
towards non-economic damages such as pain and suffering. Id. See Hearings on H.F.
1776 Before the House Financial Institution and Insurance Committee 74th Minn. Legis., 2d
Sess., Feb. 19, 1986 (audio tape) (argument by Tom Pearson, Minnesota Defense
Lawyer's Assoc., that the civil damages system is for compensatory not punitive ac-
tions). Accord, Meetings on S.F. 1670 Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 74th Minn.
Legis., 1986 Sess., Feb. 26, 1986 (audio tape) (Phillip Cole, Minn. Defense Lawyers
Assoc., emphasizing that juries are behaving inconsistently with ad hoc results).
99. Trolin, supra note 1, at 10-11.
100. Tort Reform Act, ch. 455, Sec. 83, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 881 (amending
MINN. STAT. § 549.21 (1984)). The amended statute now reads:
REIMBURSEMENT FOR CERTAIN COSTS IN CIVIL ACTIONS. Subdi-
vision 1. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IN PLEADINGS. The parties by their at-
torneys in any civil action shall attach to and make a part of the pleading
served on the opposite party or parties a signed acknowledgement stating
that the parties acknowledge that costs, disbursements, and reasonable at-
torney and witness fees may be awarded to the opposing party or parties
pursuant to subdivision 2.
Subdivision 2. AWARD OF COSTS. Upon motion of a party, or upon the
court's own motion, the court in its discretion may award to that party costs,
disbursements, reasonable attorney fees and witness fees if the party or at-
torney against whom costs, disbursements, reasonable attorney and witness
fees are charged acted in bad faith asserted a claim or defense that is frivo-
lous and that is costly to the other party; asserted an unfounded position
solely to delay the ordinary course of the proceedings or to harass; or com-
mitted a fraud upon the court. An award under this section shall be without
prejudice and as an alternative to any claim for sanctions that may be as-
serted under the rules of civil procedure. Nothing herein shall authorize the
award of costs, disbursements or fees against a party or attorney advancing a
claim or defense unwarranted under existing law, if it is supported by a




William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [1987], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol13/iss2/2
TORT REFORM
frivolous claims or defenses. 10l This section gives a trial court the
ability to immediately castigate poor attorney practices.102 In addi-
tion, it also requires all parties to submit an acknowledgement recog-
nizing the potential award of costs for frivolous claims.103 The
amended statute removed the requirement that a party know of the
frivolity of the claim, and instead, imposes a court's opinion.104
In unusual situations, a conflict may arise between the insurer and
insured over a decision to assert or defend claims. An insured elect-
ing not to sign the acknowledgement may create a conflict of interest
between surety and client.105 This scenario would increase litigation
costs, if the conflict were not quickly resolved. A more likely prob-
lem, however, occurs where a judge is reluctant to impose the sanc-
tion.106 Penalties for frivolous claims are popular in many states.' 0 7
C. Future Damages and Pre-Judgment Interest
Further limits on conjectural damage elements address future
101. Id., subd. 2. See, e.g., Anderson v. Lindgren, 360 N.W.2d 348, 351-53 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1984) (poor behavior of appellant's attorney during trial justified award of
attorney's fees).
102. See id.
103. See id., subd. 1.
104. Id., subd. 2 (law may allow a court to interrupt bad faith activities before they
damage an entire proceeding).
105. Interview with attorney StevenJ. Muth, partner with Lasley, Gaughan, Stich
and Angell, P.A. of Minneapolis, MN (August, 1986). If the insurer loses control of
the defense it may be necessary to hire another attorney to represent the client's
interest in not signing the affidavit, or to bring a declaratory judgment action. Id. See
also United Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Louis A. Roser Co., Inc., 585 F.2d 932, 938
(8th Cir. 1978) (conflict of interest created when declaratory judgment action as to
coverage and trial on the merits combined); Prahm v. Rupp. Constr. Co., 277 N.W.2d
389, 391 (Minn. 1979) (insurer obligated to defend insured may contest coverage
without creating a conflict of interest by bringing a declaratory judgment action prior
to trial against insured); Truchinski v. Cashman, 257 N.W.2d 286, 288 (Minn. 1977)
(expressing doubt that declaratory judgment action and trial on the merits could be
combined without conflict of interest).
106. This may be due to a judge's actual impression that the suit began as a good
claim, but failed on its own merits. Judges generally do not assess costs, under the
so-called "American Rule," where each litigant is expected to bear its own costs. Cf.
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) (court re-
luctant to find exception to American Rule without specific legislative mandate);
Fownes v. Hubbard Broadcasting Inc., 310 Minn. 540, 542, 246 N.W.2d 700, 702
(1976) (court may award attorney fees without statutory mandate where one party
has acted in bad faith). Further discussion ofjudicial "impressions" is contained in
Alsop & Herr, supra note 90, at 324-25 (discussion of judicial impressions) (citing
Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "'Hunch ' in Judicial Decision, 14
CORNELL L. Q 274 (1929)).
107. See ALAsKA STAT. § 9.55.536(g) (1983) (medical malpractice actions only);
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-17-101 to 106 (1986) (applicable to any civil action com-
menced or appealed); TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-1-122 (1980) (frivolous appeals only).
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damages and pre-judgment interest calculations.108 Expert testi-
mony contemplating "projected inflationary or noninflationary
changes" in future damages is no longer permitted.109 Similarly, in-
creases in earnings based upon general economic statistics are not
admissible.110 Instead, trial courts are restricted to a review of
noninflationary changes in earnings that are "reasonably certain to
108. Tort Reform Act, ch. 455, § 86, 1986 Minn. Laws, 840, 882-83. (to be codi-
fied at MINN. STAT. § 604.07 (1986)). The statute reads as follows:
Subdivision 1. DEFINITIONS.
(a) For purposes of this section, the following terms have the meanings
given them.
(b) "Economic loss" means all pecuniary harm for which damages are re-
coverable, including, but not limited to, medical expenses, loss of earn-
ings, and loss of earning capacity.
(c) "Future damages" means all damages which the trier of fact finds will
accrue after the damage findings are made.
(d) "Intangible loss" means embarrassment, emotional distress, and loss
of consortium.
(e) "Noneconomic loss" means pain, disability, and disfigurement.
(f) "Past damages" means all damages that have accrued when the damage
findings are made.
Subd. 2. DISCOUNT REQUIRED. In all actions seeking damages for per-
sonal injury, wrongful death, or loss of means of support, awards of all fu-
ture damages, including economic, noneconomic and intangible loss,
reasonably certain to occur must be discounted to present value as provided
in this section.
Subd. 3. FUTURE DAMAGES; EVIDENCE. The amount of all future dam-
ages, including economic, noneconomic and intangible loss reasonably cer-
tain to occur, must be ascertained at the time of trial without reference to
projected inflationary or noninflationary changes. Evidence of noninflation-
ary changes in earnings or earning capacity that are reasonably certain to
occur is admissible, but this evidence is limited to the present value of the
future changes without regard to inflationary changes. Projected increases
in earnings or earning capacity dependent upon general economic statistics
are not admissible.
Subd. 4. DISCOUNT RATE. The award calculated under subdivision 3
must be reduced to present value at the time of trial by application of a
discount rate equal to:
(1) The average rate of interest on judgments under section 549.09 for the
five calendar years immediately preceeding the commencement of trial,
rounded to the nearest one-tenth, less
(2) the average increase in the Consumer Price Index for all Urban Con-
sumers, all items, as published by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics, rounded to the nearest one-tenth, for the same
five-year period. If the Labor Department statistics are not published
by the time of trial, the court shall employ the average increase over
the most recent five-year period available in the published statistics.
In no instance may the discount rate fall below two percent or rise above six
percent.
Subdivision 2 of this new section requires the statute's application to all tort actions
involving personal injury. Id., subd. 2. The cap on intangible losses, discussed infra
at notes 113-21 and accompanying text, also requires a specific jury award of the
amounts directed by this statute. See id. § 89, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 884 (to be codi-
fied at MINN. STAT. § 549.24).
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occur." l In any case, the ultimate award is limited to the present
value of the future changes.112
The present value calculation is based upon a complex formula
that utilizes average interest rates on civil judgments from the previ-
ous five years and the Consumer Price Index."t 3 However, under no
circumstances is the rate to fall below two percent or rise above six
percent. 114
The prejudgment statute itself was amended to more closely link
the effect of offers and counteroffers upon the calculation of pre-
judgment interest.115 Subsequent offers and counteroffers now
111. Id.
112. Id., subd. 4. The present value requirement is new to Minnesota law. The
new statute could make arguments of pain and suffering on a per diem basis im-
proper. It has been suggested that the best way to resolve the problem of calculating
future intangible losses under the statute is to assume a cash flow equal to the gross
intangible damage award. See Cole, supra note 69, at 11.
For example, the author assumes that a $250,000 award to a plaintiff with a 25
year life expectancy should result in a $10,000 annual cash flow. The present value
of the award is $143,809. Id. The new statute, effective Aug. 1, 1986, applies to all
actions pending and commenced after that date. Id.
113. Tort Reform Act, ch. 455, § 86, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 883 (to be codified at
MINN. STAT. § 604.07, subd. 4).
114. Id.
115. Id. § 81, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 879-80 (amending MINN. STAT. § 549.09,
subd. 1 (1984)). As amended, subdivision 1 provides, in part:
(b) Except as otherwise provided by contract or allowed by law, pre-verdict
or pre-report interest on pecuniary damages shall be computed as provided
in clause (c) from the time of the commencement of the action, or the time
of a written settlement demand, whichever occurs first, except as provided
herein. The action must be commenced within 60 days of a written settle-
ment demand for interest to begin to accrue from the time of the demand.
If either party serves a written offer of settlement, the other party may serve
a written acceptance or a written counter-offer within 60 days. After that
time interest on the judgment shall be calculated by the judge in the follow-
ing manner. The prevailing party shall receive interest on any judgment
from the time the action was commenced or a written settlement demand
was made, or as to special damages from the time when special damages
were incurred, if later, until the time of verdict or report only if the amount
of its offer is closer to the judgment than the amount of the opposing party's
offer. If the amount of the losing party's offer was closer to the judgment
than the prevailing party's offer, the prevailing party shall receive interest
only on the amount of the settlement offer or the judgment, whichever is
less, and only from the time the action was commenced or a written settle-
ment demand was made, or as to special damages from when the special
damages were incurred, if later, until the time the settlement offer was
made. Subsequent offers and counteroffers supersede the legal effect of
earlier offers and counteroffers. For the purposes of clause (3), the amount
of settlement offer must be allocated between past and future damages in
the same proportion as determined by the trier of fact. Except as otherwise
provided by contract or allowed by law, pre-verdict or pre-report interest
shall not be awarded on the following:
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eradicate the legal effect of earlier offers.116 Previously, the statute
required a written response within sixty days of a previous written
offer.1l7 However, subsequent counteroffers or demands in ongoing
negotiations created controversy as to which offer controlled.18 In
all cases, the controlling offer must occur within sixty days of the
lawsuit's initiation (or August 1, 1984, if initiated prior to that time)
to trigger the pre-judgment interest statute."l 9
An additional amendment also removed interest calculations on
any award of future damages. 120 This preclusion operates against
interest calculations that are based upon the verdict or a written set-
tlement offer lower than the verdict.
D. Cap on Damages Resulting from Intangible Loss
One of the more tentative measures adopted by the legislature is
the new ceiling on claims for intangible losses.' 2 ' Intangible losses
are defined as damage resulting from embarrassment, emotional dis-
tress, or loss of consortium.122 The total amount of damages may
(2) judgments, decrees, or orders in dissolution, annulment, or legal sepa-
ration actions;
(3) judgments for future damages;
(4) punitive damages, fines, or other damages that are noncompensatory in
nature;
(5) judgments not in excess of the amount specified in section 487.30; and
(6) that portion of any verdict or report which is founded upon interest, or
costs, disbursements, attorney fees, or other similar items added by the
court.
(c) The interest shall be computed as simple interest per annum. The rate of
interest shall be based on the secondary market yield of one year United
States treasury bills, calculated on a bank discount basis as provided in this
section.
116. Id., subd. 1, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 879. The new section requires that the
action be commenced within 60 days of the demand in order to be effective. Id.
117. 1984 Minn. Laws ch. 549.09, subd. 1 (codified as MINN. STAT. § 549.09, subd.
1 (1984)).
118. Interview with attorney Steven J. Muth, supra note 105.
119. Tort Reform Act, ch. 455, § 81, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 879-80 (amending
MINN. STAT. § 549.09 (1984)).
120. Id., subd. 1(3), 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 880.
121. Id. § 88, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 883-84 (to be codified at MINN. STAT.
§ 549.23 (1986)). This section provides as follows:
Subdivision 1. DEFINITION. For purposes of this section, "intangible
loss" means embarrassment, emotional distress, and loss of consortium. In-
tangible loss does not include pain, disability or disfigurement.
Subd. 2. LIMITATION. In civil actions, whether based on contract or tort,
the amount of damages per person for intangible losses may not exceed
$400,000.
Subd. 3. JURY NOT INFORMED OF LIMITATION. The court may not
inform the jury of the existence of the limitation in subdivision 2.
Subd. 4. NOT NEW ACTION. This section does not create a new cause of
action for intangible loss.
Id.
122. Id., subd. 2.
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not exceed $400,000.123 The cap, however, does not include the
equally intangible losses resulting from pain and suffering, disability,
or disfigurement. 124 It appears that the legislature simply capped
those damage elements with which it least sympathized. More recog-
nizable economic losses, such as wage loss and medical expenses, are
not capped in any way. 125
While the statute requires that a jury may not be informed of the
cap on intangible losses,126 their separation from other elements
may be felt elsewhere. The separation of intangible losses from pain
and suffering, disfigurement, and disability, now requires the jury to
make additional damage calculations.127 The possibility exists, in
some cases, that total awards will actually increase as a result.128
V. CHANGES IN SPECIFIC AREAS OF TORT LAw
A. Limitations on Actions for Damages Based on Improvements to Real
Property
In response to complaints by the construction industry that it suf-
fered from high insurance premiums, the statute of repose governing
claims against the industry was lowered from fifteen years to ten.1 29
Construction lobbyists maintained that "tail" insurance must be re-
123. Id., subd. 1.
124. See Floor Debate on H.F. 1950 in the Minnesota Senate, 74th Minn. Legis., 1986
Sess., March 11, 1986 (audio tape) (amendment seeking to include pain and suffering
within the $400,000 cap failed). See Hearings on S.F. 1593 Before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, 74th Minn. Legis., 1986 Sess., Feb. 26, 1986 (audio tape) (originally, a
$250,000 cap was recommended for all intangible losses, including disfigurement,
pain and suffering).
125. Tort Reform Act, ch. 455, § 88, 1986 Minn. Laws, 840, 883-84.
126. Id.
127. It has been suggested that increasing the number of jury instructions on
damages increases the overall total, since a jury that returns a verdict for the plaintiff
may feel obligated to make an award for each separate category of intangible, or non-
economic losses. See Interview with attorney StevenJ. Muth, supra note 105.
128. Id.
129. See Tort Reform Act, ch. 455, § 92, 1986 Minn. Laws, 840, 885-86 (amending
MINN. STAT. § 541.051 (1984)). The former statute allowed fifteen years after con-
struction for a discoverable defect to arise as an actionable claim. MINN. STAT.
§ 541.051, subd. 1 (1984 & Supp. 1985). A plaintiff whose cause of action arose
during the fourteenth or fifteenth year enjoyed the normal two year statute of limita-
tions from the date of discovery. MINN. STAT. § 541.051, subd. 2.
In its amended form, the statute changes only the amount of time in which an
action may be brought. Tort Reform Act, ch. 455, § 92, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 885-
86 (to be codified as MINN. STAT. § 541.051 (1986)). An action today must arise
within two years after construction is completed. Id. The statute of repose was re-
duced from fifteen to ten years, and the suit must be brought within two years of
discovery in the ninth or tenth years, extending the period ultimately to twelve years.
Id. The same time limitations operate for land surveyors under the new statute. See
infra note 132 and accompanying text.
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tained long after the completion of a structure, and had pushed for
an amendment lowering the statute of repose to seven years.13o In-
dustry critics successfully argued that the useful life of a building is
much longer, however, and the construction industry should be re-
quired to indemnify construction defects for a representative time
period. 131
The Tort Reform Act also removed a somewhat arbitrary excep-
tion to the statute of limitations governing construction litigation.132
A new provision now requires actions based upon errors in land
surveys to be brought within two years after discovery of the error,
and, in any event, within ten years of the survey.133
130. Hearings on S.F. 1593 before the Senate Economic Development and Commerce Commit-
tee, 74th Minn. Legis., 1986 Sess., Feb. 19, 1986 (audio tape). Industry practice re-
quires contractors to retain liability insurance in order to obtain bids. Many
contracts are standard in form, and require both contractors and subcontractors to
carry liability insurance. The requirements were strict enough to be likened to those
of licensing procedures. Id. See Senate Floor Debate on H.F. 1950, 74th Minn. Legis.,
1986 Sess., March 11, 1986 (audio tape). Because liability under the previous stat-
utes of repose could theoretically exist for fifteen years, construction companies are
required to carry "tail" insurance for that period, at the same rates as conventional
liability insurance. Id. (comments by Sen. Sieloff). Senator Sieloff also argued that
97.9 percent of all lawsuits against the construction industry occur within seven
years, and that 99.6 percent occur within 10 years. Since the statute goes so far be-
yond the time an action would be brought, the industry is maintaining insurance for
claims that probably will not be made. Id. See supra note 6 and accompanying text
(analysis of "occurrence" versus "claims made" policies). See also Hearings on H.F.
1776 Before the House Financial and Insurance Committee, 74th Minn. Legis., 1986 Sess.,
Feb. 19, 1986 (audio tape) (comments by Rep. Voss, citing statistics indicating that
the number of lawsuits dwindles after seven years).
131. Senate Floor Debate on H.F. 1950, 74th Minn. Legis., 1986 Sess., March 11,
1986 (audio tape) (comments by Senator Luther). The lowering of the statute of
repose might not actually lead to a corresponding drop in industry standards, but
warranties and liability coverage would certainly not be offered beyond the confines
of the new statute. Id.
132. Tort Reform Act, ch. 455, § 93, 1986 Minn, Laws 840, 886 (to be codified at
MINN. STAT. § 541.052). The new statute's provisions parallel the amended version
of the two-year statute applying to the rest of the construction industry. Id.
Subdivision 1. Except where fraud is involved, no action to recover dam-
ages for an error in the survey of land, nor any action for contribution or
indemnity for damages sustained on account of an error, may be brought
against any person performing the survey more than two years after the dis-
covery of the error, nor in any event more than ten years after the date of
the survey.
Subdivision 2. Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision 1, in the case
of an action which occurs during the ninth or tenth year after the date of the
survey, an action to recover damages may be brought within two years after
the date on which the action occurred, but in no event may an action be
brought more than twelve years after the date of the survey.
Id.
133. See id., subd. 2.
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The Act creates some procedural changes in medical malpractice
actions. In all lawsuits against health care providers134 requiring ex-
pert testimony to prove a primafacie case, the plaintiff must submit
two affidavits verifying expert review.t35 The first affidavit, to be
served with the summons and complaint, must indicate that the
plaintiff's attorney has reviewed the case with a qualified expert.t3 6
This affidavit requires the attorney to submit a "reasonable expecta-
tion" that the expert's opinions will be admissible at trial.'3 7 The
affidavit must also state the expert's opinion that one or more of the
defendants deviated from an applicable standard of care, causing the
plaintiff's injuries. 138
The second affidavit requires the plaintiff's attorney to submit the
names of experts who will testify at trial on issues of malpractice or
causation.139 The affidavit must contain the substance of the facts or
opinions anticipated as testimony, with a summary of the grounds of
134. Tort Reform Act, ch. 455, § 60, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 871-72 (to be codified
as MINN. STAT. § 145.682 (1986)). Subdivision 1 of the new statute defines "health
care provider" as a "physician, surgeon, dentist or other health care professional or
hospital, including all persons or entities . . . as defined in [MINN. STAT.] § 145.61,
subdivisions 2 and 4, or a certified health care professional ... providing services as
an independent contractor in a hospital." Id.
135. Id. Subdivision 2 requires a plaintiff to proceed as follows:
In an action alleging malpractice, error, mistake, or failure to cure, whether
based on contract or tort, against a health care provider which includes a
cause of action as to which expert testimony is necessary to establish a prima
facie case, the plaintiff must: 1) unless otherwise provided in subdivision 3,
paragraph (B), serve upon defendant with the summons and complaint an
affidavit as provided in subdivison 3; and 2) serve upon defendant within
180 days after commencement of the suit an affidavit as provided by subdivi-
sion 4.
Id.
136. See id. Subdivision 3 outlines the requirements of the first affidavit:
The affidavit required by subdivision 2, clause (1), must be by the plaintiff's
attorney and state that:
(a) the facts of the case have been reviewed by the plaintiff's attorney with
an expert whose qualifications provide a reasonable expectation that the ex-
pert's opinions could be admissible at trial and that, in the opinion of this
expert, one or more defendants deviated from the applicable standard of
care and by that action caused injury to the plaintiff; or
(b) the expert review required by paragraph (a) could not reasonably be
obtained before the action was commenced because of the applicable statute
of limitations. If an affidavit is executed pursuant to this paragraph, the affi-
davit in paragraph (a) must be served on defendant or the defendant's coun-
sel within 90 days after service of the summons and complaint.
Id.
137. See id.
138. See id. Presumably, the standard is that of a reasonable practitioner under the
circumstances.
139. Id., subd. 4.
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each opinion.140 Answers to interrogatories can satisfy the require-
ments of this new statute,'41 but a failure to file the affidavits may
result in a dismissal with prejudice. 142
A new waiver of the doctor-patient privilege endorses informal
discussions involving all parties "if the health care provider con-
sents."143 It is hoped that the waiver will alleviate frustrations in-
curred by defense lawyers attempting to contact the plaintiff's
140. Id. Subdivision 4 provides as follows:
The affidavit required by subdivision 2, clause (2), must be by the plaintiff's
attorney and state the identity of each person whom plaintiff expects to call
as an expert witness at trial to testify with respect to the issues of malprac-
tice or causation, the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert
is expected to testify, and a summary of the grounds for each opinion. An-
swers to interrogatories that state the information required by this subdivi-
sion satisfy the requirements of this subdivision if they are signed by the
plaintiff's attorney and served upon the defendant within 180 days after
commencement or the suit against the defendant.
The parties or the court for good cause shown, may by agreement, provide
for extensions of the time limits specified in subdivision 2, 3, or this subdivi-
sion. Nothing in this subdivision may be construed to prevent either party
from calling additional expert witnesses or substituting other expert
witnesses.
Id.
141. See id. The interrogatories must be signed by the plaintiff's attorney and re-
turned to the defendant within 180 days of the commencement of the suit against the
defendant. Id.
142. Id., subd. 6.
143. Id. § 84, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 881-82 (amending MINN. STAT. § 595.02
(1984)). The new subdivision provides:
Subdivision 5. WAIVER OF PRIVILEGE FOR HEALTH CARE PROVID-
ERS. A party who commences an action for malpractice, error, mistake or
failure to cure, whether based on contract or tort, against a health care pro-
vider on the person's own behalf or in a representative capacity, waives in
that action any privilege existing under subdivision 1, paragraphs (d) and
(g), as to any information or opinion in the possession of a health care pro-
vider who has examined or cared for the party or other person whose health
or medical condition has been placed in controversy in the action. This
waiver must permit all parties to the action, and their attorneys or author-
ized representatives, to informally discuss the information or opinion with
the health care provider if the provider consents. Prior to an informal dis-
cussion with a health care provider, the defendant must mail written notice
to the other party at least 15 days before the discussion. The plaintiff's at-
torney or authorized representative must have the opportunity to be present
at any informal discussion. Appropriate medical authorizations permitting
discussion must be provided by the party commencing the action upon re-
quest from any other party.
A health care provider may refuse to consent to the discussion but, in that
event, the party seeking the information or opinion may take the deposition
of the health care provider with respect to that information and opinion,
without obtaining a prior court order.
For purposes of this subdivision, "health care provider" means a physician,
surgeon, dentist, or other health care professional or hospital, including all
persons or entities providing health care as defined in section 145.61, subdi-
visions 2 and 4, or a certified health care professional employed by or pro-
viding services as an independent contractor in a hospital.
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treating physician.144 The physician often maintains a witness rela-
tionship to material events contributing to a claim, but access is
blocked by the doctor-patient privilege.' 45
Another procedural amendment to malpractice actions alters the
tolling effect a minor's age has upon the statute of limitations.146
Previously, the statute was completely tolled until the minor attained
maturity.' 47 This created difficulties in proving or defending suits
brought ten years or more after an alleged mishap, which put a par-
ticularly high burden on practitioners involved with young children,
such as obstetricians or pediatricians.148 Under the new Act, the
144. See Note, Evidence: Waiver of Physician-Patient Privilege, 51 MINN. L. REV. 575,
582 (1967). The author points out that the privilege fosters good communication
between an ill client and the treating physician, a situation generally desirable for the
practice and society. Id. However, it also limits discovery of information by the party
most likely to shed light on the true nature of a plaintiff's injury. Cole, supra note 69,
at 10.
145. Cole, supra note 69, at 10.
146. Tort Reform Act, ch. 455, § 79, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 877-78 (amending
MINN. STAT. § 541.15 (1984)). The amended statute retains those disabilities that toll
the statute of limitations: insanity, imprisonment, alien nationality, injunction or stat-
utory prohibition. Id., subd.(l). The exception created by the new addition reads as
follows:
(b) In actions alleging malpractice, error, mistake, or failure to cure,
whether based on contract or tort, against a health care provider, the
ground of disability specified in paragraph (a), clause (1), suspends the pe-
riod of limitation until the disability is removed. The suspension may not be
extended for more than seven years, or for more than one year after the
disability ceases.
For purposes of this paragraph, health care provider means a physician, sur-
geon, dentist, or other health care professional or hospital, including all
persons or entities providing health care as defined in section 145.61, subdi-
visions 2 and 4, or a certified health care professional employed by or pro-
viding services as an independent contractor in a hospital.
Id., subd. (b). For the definition of "health care provider," see supra note 134.
147. See MINN. STAT. § 541.15 (1984).
148. See Tort Reform Act, ch. 455, § 95, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 886. Formerly, a
child could wait until the age of 18, plus a year, to bring suit. As a result, claims were
brought years after the alleged malpractice. See Hearings on S.F. 1593 Before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, 74th Minn. Legis., 1986 Sess., Feb. 26, 1986 (audio tape) (com-
ments while summarizing the bill by Senator Luther). The problem was particularly
prevalent in "bad baby" cases. Obstetricians faced lawsuits nineteen years after as-
sisting in the plaintiff's birth. Id. From 1975 to 1984, the average jury award in
medical malpractice actions rose from $95,000 to $338,000. The number of claims
filed against physicians doubled from 1981 to 1986. See Hearings on S.F. 1670 Before
the Senate Judiciary Committee, 74th Minn. Legis., 1986 Sess., Feb. 26, 1986 (audio tape)
(comments by the author, Senator Petty, citing statistics from the Minnesota Medical
Insurance Exchange (MMIE)). The pressure on obstetricians resulted in 65 family
practitioners statewide withdrawing from that particular practice, often in rural areas.
Id.
A 1985 survey of obstretricians and gynecologists revealed that 90% of those
surveyed suffered a premium increase the previous year. American College of Obste-
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statute is now tolled for a maximum of seven years.' 49 Once the mi-
nor reaches adulthood, the suit must be brought within one year. A
minor relying upon the old statute of limitations is given until Janu-
ary 1, 1987 to bring an action.150
C. Government Immunity
Municipalities should benefit from the special attention devoted to
governmental immunity by the legislature.151 As owners of large
tracts of land and providers of public services and licenses, munici-
palities have become primary targets of the "deep pocket" theory.152
As a result, litigation costs and increasing premium expenses have
had a dramatic impact on local budgets.153
Municipalities are granted immediate relief in the form of direct
immunity in several areas. An amendment to the State Tort Claims
statute now provides municipalities the same exemptions enjoyed by
the state.' 54 In addition, the Act precludes claims based on losses
tricians and Gynecologists, Professional Liability Insurance and Its Effect: Report of a Survey
of ACOG's Membership (Nov. 1985) (cited in AMA News, Dec. 6, 1985)).
149. Tort Reform Act, ch. 455, § 75, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 877-78 (amending
MINN. STAT. § 541.15 (1984)).
150. Id. § 95, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 886.
151. Floor Debate on S.F. 1950 in the Minnesota Senate, 74th Minn. Legis., 1986 Sess.,
March 11, 1986 (audio tape) (comments by Senator Sieloff). The problem of increas-
ing insurance rates owed by municipalities results from the large number of suits
against them. Though joint and several liability appeals intellectually, it was sug-
gested that the effect was to bring landowners, small businesses, and communities
into lawsuits for which they had little fault to contribute, but a lot of money. Road
construction and recreational lands were singled out in this discussion as major
sources of "deep pocket" practices. Id. See also Floor Debate on S.F. 1950 in the Minne-
sota House of Representatives, 74th Minn. Legis., 1986 Sess., March 10, 1986 (audio
tape) (comments by Rep. Halberg).
152. Public entities provide many services that are required. Hence, they are un-
able to drop high risk activities like a private corporation can. Insuring Our Future,
supra note 2, at 144-46. The increased exposure is having calamitous effects. Beyond
sky-rocketing premiums, some cities operate without liability insurance; others seek
relief from state or federal government; others are in the bankruptcy courts. Fosule,
Cities Besieged, 71 A.B.A.J. 19, 21 (Dec. 1985).
153. Officials in California predict that two-thirds of the communities in that state
will be operating without liability insurance next year. Church, supra note 34, at 19.
154. Tort Reform Act, ch. 455, § 73, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 875 (amending MINN.
STAT. § 466.03 (1984) by adding a new subdivision). The new subdivision 15 pro-
vides that "[a]ny claim against a municipality, if the same claim would be excluded
under 3.736, if brought against the state [shall likewise be excluded]." Minnesota
Statutes section 466.02 is the general provision for liability claims against the state.
Section 466.03 outlines the exceptions to the general rule. The new protection pro-
vision cited above incorporates municipalities in its scope, and includes additional
amendments to Section 466.03, discussed infra at notes 156-67. See Tort Reform Act,
ch. 455, §§ 65-73, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 874-75.
The subdivision's inclusion of Minnesota Statute section 3.736 also allows mu-
nicipalities the exemption from financial liability for torts committed in certain activi-
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caused by snow or icy conditions on public sidewalks that do not
abut publicly owned buildings and parking lots.'
55
The state exemption applying to recreational properties was sub-
stantially broadened under the new bill.156 Currently, claims based
on the construction, operation or maintenance of almost any con-
ceivable recreational property are abolished.157 A separate section
also makes a particular exemption for railroads who lease land to
state or municipal railroad authorities.l58 Conspicuously missing
ties. Id. This statute was also expanded in scope. See infra notes 155, 157, 162, 174
and accompanying text.
155. Tort Reform Act, ch. 455, § 2, 1986 Minn. Laws 840 (amending MINN. STAT.
§ 3.736 (1984 & Supp. 1985)). Subdivision 3 now provides:
EXCLUSIONS. Without intent to preclude the courts from finding addi-
tional cases where the state and its employees should not, in equity and
good conscience, pay compensation for personal injuries or property losses,
the legislature declares that the state and its employees are not liable for the
following losses:
(d) Any loss caused by snow or ice conditions on any highway or public
sidewalk that does not abut a publicly-owned building or a publicly-owned
parking lot, except when the condition is affirmatively caused by the negli-
gent acts of a state employee; ....
The state will not pay punitive damages. Id. The exception does not apply to side-
walks that "abut" public buildings and parking lots, however. This provision was
amended in committee, see Hearings on H.F. 1776 Before the House Financial Institution
and Insurance Committee, 74th Minn. Legis., 1986 Sess., Feb. 19, 1986 (audio tape); the
amendment to the bill came after the need for maintenance of public sidewalks, in
areas of the heaviest use, was recongized. Id., Feb. 12, 1986 (comments by C. Hvass,
Minnesota Trial Lawyer's Association).
Correspondingly, the exception was also added to amend Minnesota Statute sec-
tion 466.03, subd. 4 (1984 & Supp. 1985). See Tort Reform Act, ch. 455, § 65, 1986
Minn. Laws 840, 874.
156. Tort Reform Act, ch. 455, § 66, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 874 (amending MINN.
STAT. § 466.03 (1984) by adding subd. 6(e)). The new section is self-explanatory:
PARKS AND RECREATION AREAS. Any claim based upon the construc-
tion, operation, or maintenance of any property owned or leased by the mu-
nicipality that is intended or permitted to be used as a park, as an open area
for recreational purposes, or for the provision of recreational services, or
from any claim based on the clearing of land, removal of refuse, and crea-
tion of trails or paths without artificial surfaces, if the claim arises from a loss
incurred by a user or park and recreation property or services. Nothing in
this subdivision limits the liability of a municipality for conduct that would
entitle a trespasser to damages against a private person.
Id.
157. See id. This section specifically exempts municipal recreational premises lia-
bility tort claims. Id. It parallels that of the state exemption, Minnesota Statute
§ 3.736, subdivision 3(h) (1984 & Supp. 1985), and legislatively overrules Hovet v.
City of Bagley, 325 N.W.2d 813 (Minn. 1982) (municipalities not protected landown-
ers within meaning of reactional use statute).
Immunity from claims against all property owners, private and public, is com-
plete in Minnesota for property that is used by persons for recreational purposes. See
MINN. STAT. § 87.023 (1984 & Supp. 1985).
158. The legislature extended the municipality immunity provisions to railroads
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under this section, however, is an exception from claims based on a
duty to warn.159 The omission is highlighted by the provision which
retains liability for "conduct that would entitle a trespasser to dam-
ages against a private person."t 60 At the very least, the statute's con-
struction creates a possible toe-hold for an action against municipal
property owners. 1 61
Subdivision eight of the same statute limits all damage claims
against municipalities to losses of property, personal injury, or
death.i62 Uncertainty may arise as to whether this exclusion was in-
tended to apply to business torts, emotional distress, or defamation
suits. 163
All tort claims based upon the loss of benefits or compensation
due under public assistance programs, except those required by fed-
eral law, are abolished under Minnesota Statute section 466.03, sub-
division 9.164 Similarly, the act abolishes claims against the state that
may result from lack of funding to municipal hospitals or corrections
facilities. 165 The lack-of-funding exclusion coincides with the follow-
ing section of the Act, which averts lawsuits arising out of property
leasing tracks to the Regional Railroad Authority. MINN. STAT. § 398A.01-.09 (1984).
The Authority seeks to preserve existing railways in the state that private railroads
have abandoned. Id. § 398A.02.
To facilitate the Authority, Minnesota Statute § 398A.04 (1984) was amended by
adding a subparagraph:
(b) A railroad leasing its tracks and right-of-way to a railroad authority that
is created under this chapter and affiliated with a railroad museum is subject
to tort liability only to the extent provided for municipalities in chapter 466
as to any claims arising out of fare-paying passenger operations carried on
by the railroad authority primarily for the purpose of promoting tourism on
tracks and right-of-way leased from the railroad. Id.
159. See Tort Reform Act, § 65-74, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 874-75 (amending
MINN. STAT. § 466.03 (1984 & Supp. 1985).
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. Id. The additional exception to the general provision allowing suits against
the state (and now municipalities) includes: "Subd. 8 Any claim for a loss other than
injury to or loss of property or personal injury or death." Id.
163. Cole, supra note 69, at 10.
164. Tort Reform Act, ch. 455, § 68, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 875 (amending MINN.
STAT. § 466.03 (1984 & Supp. 1985) by adding subdivision 9). The new subdivision
provides as follows, an exception to the general rule: "Any claim for a loss of bene-
fits of compensation due under a program of public assistance or public welfare, ex-
cept where municipal compensation for loss is expressly required by federal law in
order for the municipality to receive federal grants-in-aid."
165. See id. MINN. STAT. § 466.03 (1984 & Supp. 1985) was amended by adding
subd. 11: [No one shall be permitted] ...
Any claim for a loss based on the usual care and treatment, or lack of care
and treatment, of any person at a municipal hospital or corrections facility
where reasonable use of available funds have been made to provide care.
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losses suffered by patients and inmates of municipal institutions.' 66
An additional amendment to Minnesota Statute section 466.03,
subdivision 10,167 was intended to ban claims arising out of failure to
issue licenses or permits.168 On its face, the statute legislatively
reverses Andrade v. Ellefson,169 a recent decision allowing a claim
against a county for negligently issuing a license to proceed.170
Interestingly, the statute only bars claims "based on the failure to
meet standards... for a license ... ."17, From its plain meaning, the
statute may not apply to situations which arise out of a failure to
actually issue a permit.172 Coincidentally, municipalities undertak-
ing inspections prior to issuing state licenses are considered employ-
ees of the state' 73 for indemnification purposes. 174  If the
municipality is clearly negligent in its supervision of the employee,
166. See id. The Tort Reform Act further amends Minnesota Statute § 466.03 by
adding subdivision 12, which precludes "[a]ny claim for a loss, damage, or destruc-
tion of property of a patient or inmate of a municipal institution." Id. § 71, 1986
Minn. Laws 840, 875.
167. Id. § 69, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 875 (amending MINN. STAT. § 466.093 (1984)
by adding subdivision 10).
168. Id. The statute also prohibits "[a]ny claim for a loss based on the failure of
any person to meet the standards needed for a license, permit or other authorization
issued by the municipality or its agents." Id.
169. 391 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1986) aff'g in part, rev' in part 375 N.W.2d 828
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985). The amendment was passed after the appellate court's deci-
sion, but before the supreme court's decision,
170. 391 N.W.2d at 843. The county's actual knowledge of overcrowding at a day
care center, along with its failure to protect a class identified by statute, constituted a
breach of duty to the children and their parents. A "special duty" is created when it
is owed to an individual, as opposed to the public at large. Id. at 842-43 (citing
Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 804-07 (Minn. 1979) and
Lorshbough v. Township of Buzzle, 258 N.W.2d 96, 102 (Minn. 1977)).
In addition, the court imposed liability because section 466.06 of Minnesota
Statutes creates a waiver of governmental immunity where the governmental entity
procures insurance. Andrade, 391 N.W.2d at 840.
171. MINN. STAT. § 466.03 (1986).
172. Id.
173. Tort Reform Act, ch. 455, § 90, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 884 (to be codified at
MINN. STAT. § 466.132 (1986)). The new statute provides:
INDEMNIFICATION BY STATE. Municipalities, when performing, as re-
quired or mandated by state law, inspections or investigations of persons
prior to the issuance of state licenses, are employees of the state for pur-
poses of the indemnification provisions of section 3.736, subdivision 9. A
municipality is not, however, an employee of the state for purposes of this
section if in hiring, supervising, or continuing to employ the person per-
forming an inspection or investigation for the municipality, the municipality
was clearly negligent.
Id.
174. Minnesota Statute § 3.736, subd. 9 (1986) states that, absent a certification
issued by the employer and approved by the attorney general, it is a question of fact
whether or not an employee was acting within the scope of his employment. Id.
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then the employee remains the sole agent of the municipality.175 A
new statute exempts directors or officers of non-profit organizations
or trusts from liabilities associated with their post.1
76
Another "stay home" provision requires municipalities to pay
damages caused when its own police officers make an arrest. 7 7 A
municipality may not indemnify an employee for punitive damages
levied against the employee.178
These amendments serve to narrow both the foreseeability and the
scope of liability that municipalities face.' 79 Arguably, insurers of
municipalitites should be able to calculate premiums with more
precision. 180
Possibly the most significant piece of legislation is the partial relax-
ation of joint and several liability for the state and municipalities. 18
175. Tort Reform Act, ch. 455, § 90, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 884 (to be codified at
MINN. STAT. § 466.132 (1986)). The state will be able to absolve itself from indemni-
fying the municipality, by showing that the municipal employee was "clearly negli-
gent." Since this remains a fact issue for the jury, a distinct possibility exists that
litigation costs will, in some situations, increase as a result of this statute. The state
will implead the municipality and the resulting lawsuit will have one, and possibly
two, additional litigants. The municipality's insurer will still be required to defend
the municipality, an increase in costs that the statute presumably seeks to end.
176. Tort Reform Act, ch. 455, § 90, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 884; (to be codified at
MINN. STAT. § 466.132 (1986)).
177. Tort Reform Act, ch. 455, § 77, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 877 (to be codified at
MINN. STAT. § 466.101 (1986)). The additional statute provides as follows:
LAW ENFORCEMENT COSTS. When costs are assessed against a munici-
pality for injuries incurred or other medical expenses connected with the
arrest of individuals violating Minnesota Statutes, the municipality responsi-
ble for the hiring, firing, training, and control of the law enforcement and
other employees involved in the arrest is reponsible for those costs.
Id.
178. Id. § 76, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 876 (amending MINN. STAT. § 466.07 (1984)
by adding a new subdivision)).
Subdivision 4 specifically provides: "A municipality may not save harmless, in-
demnify or insure an officer or employee for punitive damages levied against the
officer or employer. The municipality may provide a defense against a claim for pu-
nitive damages as a necessary incident to other elements of a defense." Id.
179. The Tort Reform Act reduces exposure in numerous areas: recreational
property, see supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text; officers, employees, and
agents, see supra notes 173-78 and accompanying text; parallel exemptions for munici-
palities and the state, see supra note 154 and accompanying text; licensing exemp-
tions, see supra notes 168-72 and text.
180. The insurance industry has previously had doubts about insuring municipali-
ties. The large number of public services, many of which are essential licensing, rec-
reational and public works projects, all create scenarios of potential liability.
The exemptions extended under the new Act serve to lower the number of these
situations. The damage caps, in conjunction with limitations on agency principles,
narrow the level of uncertainty in damage awards. As a result, insurers should be
able to anticipate lower total awards and greater predictability when calculating
premiums.
181. The concept of joint and several liability is beset with increasing criticism.
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If a government entity is jointly liable and its fault is less than thirty-
five percent, it is jointly and severally liable for no more than twice
the amount of its fault.182
Exclusive governmental enjoyment of the new joint liability statute
may create equal protection problems.183 Under the guidelines of
Kossack v. Stalling,' 84 the enactment must reflect a "rationally related
governmental purpose." 18 5 The clear intent of the legislature, how-
ever, is to limit governmental exposure in lawsuits where its fault is
less than thirty-five percent.' 8 6 The purpose of the limitation is un-
See, e.g., Granelli, The Attack on Joint and Several Liability, 71 A.B.A.J. 61 (July, 1985).
As originally adopted, the rule was only applied against defendants in concert. Re-
cent expansions of the doctrine, however, allow recovery against defendants who
were only slightly at fault for all of the damages. See Insuring Our Future, supra note 2,
at 129-33.
The legislature-contemplated similar arguments. See, e.g., Hearings on S.F. 1687
Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 74th Minn. Legis., 2d Sess., Feb. 26, 1986 (audio
tape) (comments by P. Cole likening the large awards due to joint and several liability
to a "notion of reward, rather than compensation"); Floor Debate on H.F. 1950 in the
Minnesota Senate, 74th Minn. Legis., 2d Sess., March 11, 1986 (comments by Senator
Kamrath; Sen. Seiloff opined that "every negligence suit is a winner."). Contra id.
(comments by Senator Luther that pure comparative fault system goes too far, and
leaves too many injured parties without a remedy). See also Hearings on H.F. 1776
Before The House Financial Institution and Insurance Committee, 74th Minn. Legis., 2d
Sess., Feb. 12, 1986 (audio tape). Joint and several liability does not always work
since many large companies put up a hard-nosed, expensive defense in order to earn
a reputation and avoid future suits. Id. (comments by John Stanock, Minnesota Trial
Lawyers Association).
182. Tort Reform Act, ch. 455, § 85, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 882 (amending MINN.
STAT. § 604.02, subd. 1 (1984). As amended, the statute now provides:
When two or more persons are jointly liable, contributions to awards shall
be in proportion to the percentage of fault attributable to each, except that
each is jointly and severally liable for the whole award. If the state or a
municipality as defined in section 466.01 is jointly liable, and its fault is less
than 35 percent, it is jointly and severally liable for an amount no greater
than twice the amount of fault.
Id.
183. MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subd. 1 (1984 & Supp. 1985). The statute formerly
required that: "[W]hen two or more persons are jointly liable, contributions to
awards shall be in proportions to the fault attributable to each, except that each is
jointly and severally liable for the whole award." Id. See also Note, Tort Loss Allocation
Concepts, 5 Wm. MITCHELL L. REV. 109 (1979).
184. 277 N.W.2d 30 (Minn. 1979).
185. Kossak v. Stalling, 277 N.W.2d 30, 34 n.4 (Minn. 1979) (citing Davis v. Davis,
297 Minn. 187, 210 N.W.2d 221 (1973)). The Kossak case overruled a former state
statute that required lawsuits against municipalities to be commenced within one year
of notice to the municipality. Id. at 32 (citing MINN. STAT. § 466.05, subd. 1 (1971)).
Noting that the general statute of limitations in such cases (here, an automobile
accident), was normally six years, the court held that the statute was "not rationally
related to a legitimate government purpose." Id. at 34.
186. See Floor Debate on H.F. 1950 in the Minnesota Senate, 74th Minn. Legis., 1986
Sess., March 11, 1986 (audio tape). A proposed amendment by Senator Peterson
would have shifted Minnesota to a strict comparative fault system of compensation.
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doubtedly to facilitate the lowering of premiums and to increase the
availability of insurance to governmental units.187 In view of the rec-
ognized "insurance crisis," this new purpose arguably supercedes
the original intent of providing full recovery to injured plaintiffs, to
the extent that municipalities can no longer bear the impact of rising
insurance costs.' 88
Joint and several liability was the focus of heated legislative de-
bate.189 There was some support for complete banishment of the
rule in Minnesota, reflecting a growing sentiment that small busi-
nesses and other "specialty lines" are less able to absorb increasing
costs for insurance.190 However, the availability of an adequate rem-
edy to injured parties is still a paramount concern of the legisla-
ture.11 Joint and several liability remains a mainstay in Minnesota's
comparative fault tort scheme, but the insurance crisis will place
more scrutiny on the sources of income necessary to maintain it.
Faced with the same crisis, other jurisdictions have limited or abol-
ished joint and several liability. 192
The amendment actually carried on an erroneous voice vote, which was renounced.
Id. See also supra note 46 and accompanying text.
During the same debate, it was suggested that municipalities are often stuck with
the entire damage award, even if their liability was only five percent. Id. (comments
by Sen. Sieloff).
187. Indeed, the purpose is readily seen from the title pages of the Act. See Tort
Reform Act of March 25, 1986, ch. 455, 1986 Minn. Laws 840. "An Act relating to
insurance ...."
188. The theme of the entire Act is to lower the exposure.
189. The movement to abolish joint and several liability was particularly strong in
the House. See Hearings on HF. 1776 Before the House Financial Institutions and Insurance
Committee, 74th Minn. Legis. 1st Sess., Feb. 12-26, 1986 (audio tape) (detailing
problems with "deep pocket" suits against doctors, the construction industry, small
businesses, municipalities and the state). See supra notes 33-42, discussing the House
bills. See also supra note 181 (detailing the Senate debate).
190. See also, Hearings On S. F. 1593 Before the Senate Economic Development and Finance
Committee, 74th Minn. Legis., 2d Sess. Feb. 18, 1986 (audio tape). Commissioner of
Commerce Hatch commented that "speciality lines," which have been particularly
hurt by a lack of availability of insurance, include not only charitable organizations
and small businesses, but product liability suits. Id. The implication appears to point
to the general trend of the insurance cycle, and the lack of availability and increased
expenses it causes. See generally the legislative debates cited supra.
191. See supra note 45 (comments by Senator Luther that the strength of tort re-
form is weeding out frivolous claims while retaining an adequate remedy for those
most seriously injured).
192. ALAsKA STAT. § 9.16 (1983) (allowing contribution afterjudgment and adopt-
ing Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 12 U.L.A. (1975 & Supp. 1986));
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-50.5-101 (1986) (also adopting uniform contribution act); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch 70, § 301 (Smith-Hurd 1979 & Supp. 1986) (allowing contribution
among tortfeasors); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258 (1974) (comparative negligence only);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1979 & Supp. 1986) (comparative negligence only).
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The Minnesota Tort Reform Act is, in many respects, typical of the
responses developed by various states to the liability insurance prob-
lem.19 3 The Act reflects the differing philosophies of the interests
affected by high premium costs and a lack of available insurance.
In order to aid insurance actuarials in properly calculating pre-
mium rates, particularly in "specialty" commercial lines, the Minne-
sota legislature instituted various tort changes.194 Hopefully, the
specific reforms in medical malpractice,195 litigation,196 and govern-
mental immunityt97 will provide immediate relief to those individu-
als who purchase liability insurance. The complexity of the financial,
underwriting, and market relationships, however, has limited both
the scope of the tort changes and the ability to measure the effect of
the changes on premium prices and availability of insurance.198 The
increased disclosure requirements,19 9 solidification of the JUA,200
and the controversies in the legislature itself all provide insufficient
factual data upon which to base a stronger tort-insurance reform
theme.
Accordingly, many questions must be answered by the private in-
surance industry. Current debates cover not only how much further
regulation is necessary, but how much disclosure of investment cash
flows and underwriting practices will be necessary to understand the
problem.201 Some critics feel that insurers have collaborated and are
using the "crisis" to pressure legislatures into lowering their risk ex-
posure at the expense of injured plaintiffs.202 Other parties, con-
cerned about the delicate relationship between the public sector and
the insurance industry, argue that stronger tort reform measures
should be taken and studied further before increasing regulatory
remedies.203 It appears certain, however, that liability insurers can
193. Telephone interview with Brenda Trolin, Research Coordinator for the Na-
tional Conference of State Legislators, (September 1986). See generally Trolin, supra
note 29, describing the major areas of tort reform addressed by other states.
194. See supra notes 72-129 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 134-48 and accompanying text.
196. Included are changes in the collateral source rule, supra notes 72-86 and ac-
companying text; pleading and assessment of punitive damages and frivolous claims,
supra notes 87-107 and accompanying text; calculation of future damages and pre-
judgment interest, supra notes 108-20 and accompanying text; as well as a cap on
some intangible damages totals, supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 151-80 and accompanying text.
198. See Insuring Our Future, Vol. II, supra note 2, at 10-15.
199. See supra note 66-68 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text.
201. Interview with B. Trolin, supra note 196. See also Insuring Our Future, supra
note 2.
202. See Hunter, supra note 4, at 4-8.
203. Insuring Our Future, supra note 2, at 58-59.
1987]
37
Roeder: Introduction to Minnesota's Tort Reform Act
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1987
WILLIAM MITCHELL L4 W REVIEW
no longer base underwriting policies on investment principles that
result in bulging rates and coverage gaps. The availability of insur-
ance, both in terms of full coverage and affordable prices, serves too
great a public need.
Whether the JUA and its supporting measures can provide a satis-
factory alternative to private insurance or become a quick bail-out
for undesirable high risks is not clear. The JUA offers insurance to
"anyone refused," but is both costly and unwieldly.204 One of the
greatest attributes of the current tort system is the flexible array of
remedies it provides an injured party. Greater public involvement
could, in time, tradeoff this availability in favor of a system that pro-
vides an exclusive remedy, such as the No-Fault Act and the Work-
ers' Compensation Statute.
Many proposed solutions have emanated from sources working to
solve the problem. In order to increase competition and possible
anti-trust action against insurers, some argue for a repeal of the Mc-
Carren-Ferguson Act.2 05 Similar proposals suggest more federal in-
volvement and allowing banks to compete directly with insurance
companies.2 0 6
Other suggested solutions would keep control of insurance in the
hands of private companies, but limit their ability to abandon certain
lines of insurance. These include "flex-rating" systems, which would
limit the percentage of increase or decrease in premium rates that an
insurer may charge in a given year.20 7 Similar proposals would re-
quire stable insurer reserves at levels necessary to meet claims.208
Others argue a need for standardized insurance policies to achieve
more uniform judicial interpretations.209
Further tort reform is also being encouraged. Some suggestions
include fixed rates of tort compensation and legal fees,210 further
penalties for frivolous claims,211 and encouragement of offensive
collateral estoppel.2t 2 Other advocates would return the tort system
204. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
205. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1945). The pros and cons of removing the law
from the federal statutes are discussed in Insuring Our Future, supra note 2, at 35-37.
206. Hunter, supra note 4, at 10-11.
207. Id. at 20. See also Insuring Our Future, supra note 2, at 93-98. A "flex-rating"
system allows insurance companies to adjust actual rates of premium costs to reflect
the insurance business cycle. It sets the limits on the upward and downward varia-
tions in the rates charged, however, so consumers are not priced out of the market
when the cycle reaches its trough. Id. See also supra notes 4-16 and accompanying
text.
208. See generally Hunter, supra note 4, at 3-4 (discussing need for effective, effi-
cient regulation of industry).
209. Insuring Our Future, supra note 2, at 39-45.
210. Hunter, supra note 4, at 31-33.
211. Id. at 33-35.
212. See id. at 36-37.
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to a complete reliance on fault as the sole basis of recovery, as op-
posed to risk-spreading.213
It is doubtful that the tort and insurance reform measures enacted
are complete. As the "crisis" continues through the current cycle,
the opportunity to explore the scope and gravity of the problem will
lead to more definite remedies. The short-term outlook, however,
indicates a rough ride for those entities who rely on insurance
availability.
E. Curtis Roeder
213. See generally The Need for Reform, supra note 15. The report contains a good
discussion of the evolution of tort law and the gradual erosion of fault as the remedial
guide, in favor of risk spreading.
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